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ABSTRACT 
 
This study outlined the changing social and legal contexts insofar as it relates to 
children’s participation in matters that affect their lives.  It set out the debates in the 
literature on whether not children should participate in family law matters, 
specifically custody disputes, and if so, how this participation should take place.  It 
also drew upon research studies which have explored directly children’s views on the 
issue.  The challenges involved in custody evaluations were scrutinised, specifically 
in relation to the Family Advocate’s Office, and alternative and/or complementary 
methods of accessing the child’s voice were considered.  In South Africa, in all access 
and/or custody disputes, the Family Advocate’s Office is tasked with making 
recommendations to the court, which are in the child’s best interest.  The recently 
promulgated provisions of the Children’s Act (2005) also require that the child’s 
views and wishes be taken into consideration.  Accordingly, this research study 
involved a thematic content analysis of 10 Family Counsellor reports, in order to 
determine how the child’s voice is accessed by the Family Advocate’s Office.  A 
structural model illustrating how the child’s voice was represented in the reports was 
developed.  It showed that the child’s voice was represented in three distinct ways, 
namely: the child’s voice is accessed directly; the child’s voice is disqualified; and the 
archetypal child’s voice is accessed through a proxy.  The findings showed a tendency 
to rely more on accessing the archetypal child’s voice through a proxy, which 
typically included reporting that was less descriptive and more inferential, interpretive 
and opinion-laden.  A need for more direct, non-disqualified means of accessing 
and/or reporting on the child’s views and wishes was indicated.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Historically, children became involved in custody and/or access1 disputes when their 
married parents divorced, and agreement could not be reached regarding their 
custody.  However, since the rights of both unmarried fathers and children born out of 
wedlock are now recognised and protected by law (Children’s Act, 2005), children are 
now subjected to custody disputes flowing from either the dissolution of their parents’ 
marriage or from being born to parents who are unmarried and who are no longer in a 
relationship with each other.  The liberalisation of the family law system has resulted 
in, the demise of the maternal preference rule, the retrospective effect of unmarried 
fathers’ rights and the legal recognition of customary and religious marriages, which 
potentially escalate the number of custody disputes.  In all these cases, the Family 
Advocate’s Office is responsible for an objective assessment of the merits of each 
party’s case and for making recommendations to the court.  In so doing, they are now 
obliged in terms of the law, to take into consideration a child’s views and wishes, 
while bearing in mind that ultimately children’s participation has to be balanced 
against what is in their best interest (sections 7, 10, 31 Children’s Act, 2005).   
 
This study reviewed the social and legal reformations which have led to legislative 
changes in South Africa.  It presented the debates for and against children’s 
participation in custody disputes, including children’s views on the matter.  The 
challenges facing custody evaluators, specifically at the Family Advocate’s Office 
was discussed and alternative and/or competing methods of accessing the voice of the 
child was considered. 
 
1.1 Aims of the study 
 
In the light of the recent legislative changes, the current study aimed to explore how 
the Family Advocate’s Office accessed the voice of the child in custody disputes.  The 
                                                 
1
 The Children’s Act (2005), parts of which were promulgated in 2007, has introduced a number of 
terminology changes.  An over-arching phrase, “Parental responsibilities and rights” replaces terms 
such as custody, access and care.  For ease of reference, in this study the term “custody” refers to 
disputes involving children’s primary residence, access and/or care. 
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study also had a specific objective to develop a structural model to illustrate how the 
child’s voice was represented in the Family Counsellors’ reports. 
 
1.2 Rationale 
Although research studies conducted at the Family Advocate’s Offices in South 
Africa have explored whether or not children’s voices are being accessed in the 
custody evaluation process (Africa, Dawes, Swartz, & Brandt, 2003; Barrat, 2003; 
Burman, Derman, & Swanepoel, 2000; Glasser, 2003; Louw & Scherrer, 2004), as 
yet, there is a paucity of research exploring and describing how children’s voices are 
being represented in the reports produced by the Family Advocate’s Office.  It was 
therefore necessary and relevant to research this issue, particularly post-2005 
following the initial tabling in the Children’s Bill (2005) of the Family Advocate’s 
Office’s statutory obligations.  Accordingly, it was decided that the Family 
Counsellors’ reports, which form part of the Family Advocates’ reports would 
comprise the sample in this study as the Family Counsellors play a key role in 
assessing the children and making custody-related recommendations, which are 
submitted to the court (Africa et al., 2003; Burman et al, 2000).  Reports are 
considered to “best reflect child custody practices and procedures” (Bow & Quinnell, 
2002, p. 165), instead of self-reports or interviews, which are subjective, and create 
the potential for respondents/participants to “report on their ideal or best practices, 
whereas actual practice may vary from case to case (Horvath, Logan, & Walker, 
2002, p. 558).  Thus, archival data was selected as it represented the actual workings 
of the Family Advocate’s Office as opposed to self-reports or interviews, which may 
have given a distorted picture of how the child’s voice was accessed.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter explores the literature relating to the growing recognition of children as 
social and political beings, who have over time been given increasing rights which are 
now protected in international and domestic laws.  The implementation of these rights 
have galvanized academics and experts in the legal, social science and mental health 
fraternities to debate how these rights should be effectively implemented.  While there 
is a meeting place on some issues, views in this regard vary considerably too.  This 
literature review attempts to summarize the different academic opinions and also 
includes studies which have researched how children feel about their participation in 
general, and in regard to custody related matters.  The challenges encountered in the 
process of custody evaluations are discussed, specifically focusing on the Family 
Advocate’s Office.  Research which has explored alternative methods of child 
participation is briefly outlined. 
2.1 Children are people too 
Since the 1960s, children have increasingly been seen as having rights of their own 
and not merely as the property of their parents (Davies, 2004).  While there has been a 
definite paradigm shift towards recognizing children as citizens in there own right, it 
appears from the literature that there is also a mindfulness about the specific qualities 
of children that make them different to adults.  Therefore, on the whole, a more 
substantive approach, which recognises this difference, has been proposed as a 
preferred way of protecting children’s rights.  Thus, Neale (2002) argues in favour of 
a social model of citizenship which “is closely aligned with children’s own thinking, 
for it grounds the individualized rights of recognition, respect and participation within 
the relational ethics of care, responsibility and interdependence” (p. 470).  Bearing in 
mind children’s playfulness and their need for protection, Jans (2004) advocates a 
‘children-sized’ citizenship which recognises their meaningful participation in society 
but does not grant them the same (which does not imply less important) rights and 
responsibilities given to adults.  Yet, the appreciation of children as “fully fledged 
citizens” is crucial in order to avoid “a regression to adult-orientated disputes” 
(Moloney, 2008, p. 46).  According to Taylor (2006) attention has been directed to 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 4
children’s role as “citizens and social actors with their own views and strategies for 
active coping within their family and community” (p. 156).  With regard to family law 
matters, there has been a shift in focus from a deficits model, which explores the 
negatives of divorce on a child and identifies harmful risk factors, to a strength-based 
model, which instead identifies factors that have been beneficial to children who have 
successfully come through family change (Flowerdew & Neale, 2003).  Thus, there 
has been a veritable shift from the marginalized and silenced position of children to a 
“theme of voice” which Thorne (2002) defines as “claiming the right not only to 
speak but also to be listened to – [which] has become a metaphor for political 
recognition, self-determination and full presence in knowledge” (p. 251).   
Swartz’s (2005) paper, “Can the Clinical Subject Speak? Some Thoughts on 
Subaltern2 Psychology”, which draws on Spivak’s (1993, cited in Swartz, 2005) 
Subaltern Studies on the “historically muted subject” (p. 505), is apposite in the 
context of the growing recognition of children as political citizens who have a voice 
that deserves an unfettered hearing.  Swartz’s (2005) paper deals more specifically 
with the ‘othering’ of the clinical subject, who is spoken for, and not directly engaged 
with in dialogue.  Swartz (2005) argues that clients’ voices are often subjugated to the 
“louder resonances of theories and trainings” (p. 507), which results in stories being 
“filtered through diagnostic and therapeutic monoculars, and tailored for the record of 
pre-existing identities” (p. 513).  She argues that clinical subjects speak, however they 
speak under erasure and therefore she cautions that “erasure and professional 
deafness” should not be conflated with “failure to speak” (p. 520).  Thus, Swartz’s 
(2005) argument is particularly compelling in the light of the ongoing research which 
has been concerned with how children are engaged, whether as research participants 
or as clients/interviewees, so that they can participate meaningfully as children, in the 
public and private arenas of life, including within the family law context.   
Tracing a similar line of argument in essence, Komulainen (2007) cautions against the 
danger of conceptualizing childhood from a needs perspective, as this leads to 
“cultural and personal assumptions about children, which are not attributable to 
children’s ‘innate’ nature as such” (p. 22).  Further, she calls for a broader 
                                                 
2
 The term “subaltern”, is a rank given to an officer in the British Army, which is below the rank of 
Captain (Swartz, 2005).  The term has been used to describe “all those systematically excluded from 
the powerful systems of representations, who as a result, “cannot speak” (Swartz, 2005, p. 507). 
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understanding of the concept of ‘voice’ which comprises more than that which is 
“verbal, textual or linguistic” as this limits and disqualifies ‘voices’ (for example in 
the case of young disabled children) that are non-verbal, “even though, sometimes, 
physical movements (actions) and noises are obviously more important than the use of 
words” (Komulainen, 2007, pp. 23-24).  Komulainen (2007) highlights that 
communication is complex, and therefore to interpret ‘voice’ literally potentially 
silences and negates many groups of people.  For these reasons, she advocates that 
researchers be vigilant of what they expect to hear from participants and how these 
expectations may impact on adult-child interactions. 
In his summary of the results of the Economic and Social Research Council’s research 
programme, which funded 22 projects exploring different aspects of contemporary 
childhood in the United Kingdom, Prout (2002) noted that the inclusion of children as 
research participants in many of the research projects showed that engaging children 
directly, respects and recognises the fact that children have a different standpoint to 
adults and while they do not form a homogenous group, there are certain 
commonalities between them which would remain unknown if adults always speak on 
their behalf.   
Hill (2006) found in his study on children’s perspectives on methods used in research 
and consultation, that amongst the many methods used by researchers, there was no 
consensus amongst the children regarding one preferred research or consultation 
method and that the children themselves identified that factors such as personality, 
temperament and literacy, could affect a child’s preference for a particular method of 
participation and therefore the child should be given a choice from a range of options.  
For example, Edmond (2002, cited in Hill, 2006) gave her research participants a 
choice regarding how they would like to express themselves and consequently her 
interviews consisted of talk, and some also included drawings, games and role plays.  
Even though Hill’s (2006) research does not address directly the role of children’s 
participation in family law matters, it is nevertheless analogous as the inter-
generational contact between the interviewer/custody evaluator and the child creates a 
dynamic which can potentially result in the child’s voice being mis-heard or negated. 
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2.2 Children’s rights enshrined 
 
The movement towards a more progressive way of conceptualising the child, 
culminated in the way of the United Nations Charter on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCROC) in 1989.  Article 12, which has been referred to as a “landmark in the 
history of childhood” (Taylor, 2006, p. 160) attracted considerable scrutiny and a 
plethora of debate regarding its interpretation and applicability.  It provides: 
 
1. State parties shall ensure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child. 
 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, 
either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law. (Article 12, UNCROC) 
 
Article 12 makes explicit that all children are independent subjects and it makes a call 
in general, for their participation (Hart, 1992).  In his seminal article, “Childrens’s 
participation: From tokenism to citizenship”, Hart (1992) refers to “participation” as  
 
“…the process of sharing decisions which affect one’s life and the life of the 
community in which one lives.  It is a means by which a democracy is built 
and it is a standard against which democracies should be measured.  
Participation is the fundamental right of citizenship. (p. 5) 
 
Thus, children’s participation in decision-making is vital for a nation’s democracy 
(Hart, 1992).  The significance of UNCROC is that it was the first international 
instrument that brought together states’ obligations with respect to the protection, 
provision and participation rights of children under the age of 18 years (Taylor, 2006).  
Moreover, it also reflected the paradigm shift towards recognising the “personhood, 
integrity, and autonomy” of children (Freeman, 1998, p. 433) from being merely the 
objects of “paternalistic protection” (Atwood, 2003, p. 650).  South Africa ratified 
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UNCROC in 1995, and is therefore obliged to ensure that children are given the 
opportunity to express their views in matters and to be heard in judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting them (Kassan, 2004).  
 
Commentators have recognised that the right afforded in terms of Article 12 is not 
absolute and that a child’s views will be given weight according to the child’s age and 
maturity (Sloth-Nielson, 1995, cited in Barratt, 2002), while also bearing in mind that 
“the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” (Article 3, 
UNCROC).  Nevertheless, it is also accepted that a decision-maker cannot simply 
ignore a child’s point of view on the basis that he or she lacks the requisite capacity in 
terms of his or her level of maturity (Barratt, 2002).  Article 12(2) recognises that 
children’s participation may not be direct (Atwood, 2003).  Generally, Article 12 
affords children a right to participate in all areas affecting their lives and therefore by 
implication, this has been interpreted as protecting the child’s voice in custody 
proceedings (Atwood, 2003).   
 
Closer to home, the first binding regional instrument that affords children 
participation rights is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(African Charter), which like UNCROC, recognises children as people in need of 
protection but also as autonomous beings capable of making their views heard in 
judicial and administrative proceedings (Kassan, 2004).  Article 4(2) of the African 
Charter provides: 
 
In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of 
communicating his/her own wishes, an opportunity shall be provided for the 
views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial 
representative as a party to the proceedings, and those shall be taken into 
consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws. 
 
In accordance with the provisions in the UNCROC and the African Charter and 
following the trend of English and Australian legislation, amongst others, South 
Africa recently promulgated the Children’s Act (2005), which protects children’s 
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rights in general, and requires that a court give “due consideration” to the child’s 
views (s10 Children’s Act, 2005).  Section 10 of the Children’s Act (2005) provides: 
 
Every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be 
able to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to 
participate in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be 
given due consideration.  
 
More specifically in relation to custody issues, section 31(1)(a) provides: 
 
Before a person holding parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a 
child takes any decision contemplated in paragraph (b) involving the child, 
that person must give due consideration to any views and wishes expressed by 
the child, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and stage of development. 
(Children’s Act, 2005) 
 
Thus, there has been a growing respect and recognition for children’s rights within the 
legal system and also within the context of the family justice system (Kaltenborn, 
2001).  The international trend towards a greater child-centered approach has led to 
debates on whether and how children’s views and wishes are to be accessed and 
ascertained, bearing in mind that ultimately their participation has to be balanced 
against what is in their best interest.  Despite the codification of children’s rights, the 
meaning of these rights and the extent to which they should be protected continue to 
be vigorously debated.  The United States of America has not ratified the UNCROC 
which has been attributed to the belief that the recognition of children’s rights would 
come at the expense of parents’ rights (Davidson, 2006).  Davidson (2006) argues that 
the ratification of the UNCROC will help support policies which will ensure that 
children’s voices are heard and that their best interests are met, while recognizing 
both parental authority and respect and dignity of the child.   
 
But even for countries that have ratified the UNCROC (or another international 
instrument protecting children’s rights), children’s participation rights remain 
unrealized for many.  According to Maundeni (2002), who researched the needs of 
children in divorced families in Botswana, the protections afforded to children in 
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terms of Article 12 were viewed as undermining a culture that demands of children 
that elders be respected, and which upholds the old adage that ‘children should be 
seen and not heard’.  In a recent review of whether children’s views were being heard 
in a number of European legal systems, Resetar and Emery (2008) found that judges 
in various jurisdictions (including England, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Croatia) 
often did not involve children, despite the presence of a legal right to express custody 
preferences in court.  And, in South Africa, an overview of South African case law 
pertaining to custody and access, reflected that the courts have not given “due regard 
to the “voices” of the children involved, and have not paid enough attention to the 
question of children’s participation in decision-making” (Barratt, 2002, p. 557).  
However, it has been noted that in the recent past, judges have shown a greater 
willingness to allow children’s voices to outweigh other competing factors (Schäfer, 
2007).  This, however seems to be in cases where the child is deemed to be 
sufficiently mature to make a decision (case law, cited in Schäfer, 2007). According 
to Pillay and Zaal (2005) the current procedural mechanisms that are intended to 
facilitate the discovery of children’s voices are inadequate and there is “frequently a 
discrepancy between what ought to happen and what actually happens” (p. 685).   
2.3 The best interest principle 
As set out above, in South Africa, as is the case in other jurisdictions, the best interest 
of the child criterion is accepted as decisive to the outcome of a case (s9, Children’s 
Act, 2005; Louw & Scherrer, 2004).  The best interest principle, formulated by the 
legal profession but understood and used widely amongst all professionals working 
with children, refers to the welfare and needs of a child (Pruett, Bruen, & Jackson, 
2000).  While its common sense meaning is generally understood and accepted, its 
interpretation is admittedly, even according to the Supreme Court of Appeal, less 
definite and determined: 
The ‘best interests of the child’ standard is, however, of necessity an 
indeterminate and relative one as the circumstances of each child within each 
family unit will vary across a wide spectrum of factors. (F v F, 2006, para [8] 
at 47E-F) 
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Research has also shown that there is little consensus regarding the interpretation of 
the best interest principle (Pruett et al., 2000).  For example in Pruett et al’s (2000) 
study, the parent and attorney participants differed in terms of the criteria they used to 
determine what is in a child’s best interest, and even fathers and mothers differed on 
some scores.  One explanation offered for the general lack of consensus regarding its 
interpretation is that the best interest principle is at the mercy of dominant orthodoxies 
at any point in time and therefore it is a dynamic concept, subject to changing 
interpretations (Neale, 2002).  A further argument is that the best interest principle is 
beset with two main difficulties: first it is indeterminate in that there in no one truth 
regarding what is in a child’s best interest and what values are important, and second, 
there is a problem of culture, as the best interest principle cannot be divorced from 
cultural frameworks and one culture may not accept another culture’s version 
(Thomas and O’Kane, 1998).   
South Africa has tried to ameliorate to some extent the uncertainty plaguing the 
interpretation of the best interest principle by codifying in the Children’s Act (2005), 
the criteria enumerated in the seminal case of McCall v McCall (2005), which are to 
be weighed when considering what is in the best interest of a child.  In considering 
what is in a child’s best interest, the courts now have to consider the criteria in section 
7 of the Children’s Act (2005) 3 and at the same time, consider the child’s views and 
wishes in terms of section 31 (Children’s Act, 2005).  Clearly then, the child’s views 
and wishes are just one of many factors which the court will take into account while 
upholding the paramountcy of the best interest principle.  Some commentators still 
argue that while a child’s wish “may be just one factor, it may often be the most 
indispensable…” (Crosby-Currie, 1996, p. 309).  Yet others argue that reliance on the 
child’s preference in order to resolve the indeterminacy of the best interest model, is 
inappropriate and instead, where necessary, the model of the best interest principle 
should be revised (Starnes, 2003).  Kandel (1994) argues that it is necessary to 
approach the best interest enquiry from an empowerment/personhood paradigm 
instead of from a protectivist/patienthood view of the child so that the enquiry begins 
                                                 
3
 Section 7 includes an extensive list of criteria which the court must take into consideration when 
considering what is in a child’s best interest.  Examples of the criteria that the court must consider 
include: the relationship between the parents and the child, the attitude of the parents towards the child 
and towards their parental responsibilities, the capacity of the parents to provide for the needs of the 
child, including emotional and intellectual needs, the likely effect on the child of any change in the 
child’s circumstances and the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm. 
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with the assumption that children are developing, legal persons, and not with a 
blanket view of children as “delicate, incompetent, and at risk” (p. 376).  The law 
should pose questions to psychology from the empowerment/personhood perspective, 
in order to avoid undermining the child’s personhood and decision-making powers 
(Kandel, 2004).  Woodhouse (2002) adopts a balanced approach to interpreting the 
best interest principle while recognising children’s rights, which requires holding in 
mind both the child’s dependency, and the child’s potential for eventual autonomy.   
2.4 Is the best interest principle, in the child’s best interest? 
Notwithstanding its status as the guiding principle in family law matters involving 
children, the best interest principle has come under attack for paradoxically being the 
legal device which legitimately silences children’s voices (James, 2008).  According 
to Neale (2002) exercise of the best interest principle often results in children’s views 
being relegated as the law presumes to know what is in their best interest.  
Consequently, “the child of legal discourse has become a somewhat generalized, 
theoretical child rather than a real, embodied, biologically unique and socially 
differentiated child” (Neale, 2002, p. 458).  Similarly, in the discussion of the effect 
of the provisions of the Children Act (1989) in England (which includes similar 
provisions to South Africa’s Children’s Act, 2005) James (2008) argues that parents 
will inevitably resort to and rely on the “language and the rhetoric of the child’s best 
interests in order to substantiate and legitimate their respective arguments in relation 
to residence and contact” (p. 58).  As a result, the rhetoric of the best interest principle 
serves as a proxy for the language of parental rights, and as a consequence, parents’ 
rights continue to outweigh the rights of their children (James, 2003 cited in James, 
2008).  Aubrey and Dahl (2006) found that in the pursuit of upholding the best 
interest principle, certain assumptions in practice (such as the need to have contact 
with both parents, unless exceptional circumstances exist) overrode the child’s 
expressed wishes and feelings.  It has also been argued that children’s views need to 
yield to their long term autonomy interests (Barratt, 2002) but questions have been 
raised about what aspects of the child’s future should be considered (Hemrika & 
Heyting, 2004).  Hemrika and Heyting (2004) argue that the potential for children’s 
voices to be annulled is increased by references to presumed future damage, which 
strengthens parental control.  According to Neale (2002) the widespread 
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developmental view that children are “half-baked ‘products’ that will become fully 
socialized only when they reach adulthood” (p. 457), focuses more attention on how 
they may turn out in the future rather than on their present day-to-day lives.  The 
literature therefore shows that in practice, the enquiry is not limited to what is in a 
child’s best interest currently, but is rather more open-ended, and tries to project into 
the future what will be in the child’s best interest now and into adulthood.   
2.5 Should children have a say? 
 
There has been considerable debate about children’s participation in legal matters and 
as yet, there is no universal agreement in the literature regarding the value of eliciting 
the child’s preference (Luftman, Veltkamp, Clark, Lannacone, & Snooks, 2005).  
Instead there is a “panoply of positions” ranging from protecting children from the 
trauma of the court processes to giving them the right to be heard, and in some cases, 
to make the ultimate decision on custody and visitation (Schepard, 2004, p. 140).  
According to Warshak (2003), the two rationales for inviting children’s participation 
are enlightenment and empowerment.  Enlightenment suggests that input from 
children will raise decision-makers’ awareness of the child’s needs, feelings and 
preferences and empowerment suggests that children will profit by participating in 
decisions that directly affect their lives (Warshak, 2003).  While some academics 
strongly contend that participation of the child in custody decision-making is 
“essential” (Kaltenborn, 2001, p. 110), others recognise that “children do not always 
know what is best for them” (Warshak, 2003, p. 374).   
 
Tisdall, Bray, Cleland & Marshall (2004) raise the concern about whether asking 
children to express their views can actively work against them for two reasons: firstly, 
by creating a burden for them and secondly, by undermining parental decision-making 
powers.  Starnes’ (2003) view is that children should not be asked to state a 
preference in custody interviews if they have not done so voluntarily, and even in 
cases where they have done so, their preference should not be the deciding factor in 
the case, except in exceptional circumstances.  This is to avoid, further entanglement 
in their parents’ divorce, children’s unreasonable preferences, and the risk of feeling 
over-responsible for the custody choice (Starnes, 2003).  Asking children to state a 
preference, would amount to “placing the custody sword in the hands of babes” 
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(Starnes, 2003, p. 169).  James, James, & McNamee (2004), who conducted research 
into the work of the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Service 
(CAFCASS) in the United Kingdom, found that family court advisors adopted a 
stance that children should be protected from the pressures of having to take 
responsibility for adult issues.  In a Welsh study (Murch, Douglas, Scanlon, Perry, 
Lisles, Bader, & Borkowski, 1999, cited in Taylor, 2006), 30% of solicitors 
interviewed, held the view that children’s participation in family matters could be 
traumatic for them, that there could be an increased risk of their parents manipulating 
them, and that it is wrong to expect children to make decisions about custody and 
access.  This view in favour of protecting children from legal processes was endorsed 
by a later study involving English and Welsh solicitors (Taylor, 2006).   
 
Another argument that has been used against children’s participation in custody 
disputes is parental alienation4 (Bruch, 2001), which has led to children’s voices being 
dismissed on the assumption that their minds have been “poisoned” (Timms, 2003, 
p.165).  However, according to Bruch (2001) and Johnston (2003) this theory has 
been rejected as many other reasons exist for a child’s reluctance or refusal to visit a 
noncustodial parent and that genuine cases of alienation are rare (Johnson, 2003).  
Gould and Martindale (2007) explore parent-child dynamics where there has been 
abandonment, poor parenting and abuse in the family and distinguish these 
relationships from alienation.  In the case of alienation though, the child is given a 
message from the alienating parent that the target parent is emotionally and physically 
unavailable so that the child avoids seeking contact with the target parent (Gould & 
Martindale, 2007).  Further, the alienating parent behaves in a way that suggests to the 
child that if he or she does seek out the target parent, the alienating parent will 
withdraw his or her emotional or physical availability (Gould & Martindale, 2007).  
Accordingly, the alienating behaviour undermines the attachment process which is not 
in the child’s best interest (Gould & Martindale, 2007).  According to Gould and 
Martindale (2007), an alienated child tends to express their rejection of a parent: “(1) 
                                                 
4
 Parental Alienation Syndrome (or child alienation) is considered by some experts to be a psychiatric 
‘disorder’ (although not included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR) 
that arises exclusively within the context of child custody disputes where, “one parent systematically 
undermines a child’s relationship with the other parent” (Gould & Martindale, 2007, p. 317).  For a 
detailed discussion on the history of parental alienation syndrome and a critique of various conceptual 
models of alienation dynamics, refer to Gould and Martindale’s (2007) chapter on “Assessing 
allegations of child alienation” (p 317). 
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stridently, and (2) without apparent guilt or ambivalence, and (3) strongly resist or 
completely refuse any contact with that parent” (p. 338).  Where parental alienation is 
present Warshak (2003) has cautioned against giving weight to the child’s stated 
preferences and instead recommends relying on the ‘collective voice of children’ 
(literature informed by clinical and empirical research), which is more likely to be in 
the child’s best interest.  There remains fierce academic debate on the scientific status 
of the syndrome and its psychological formulation (Clarkson & Clarkson, 2007).  The 
issue is further complicated by gender politics and complex interpersonal processes 
and therefore parental alienation cannot be reduced to “simple villains and obvious 
victims” (Clarkson & Clarkson, 2007, p. 275).  Clearly the issue is a complicated and 
complex one, and not easy to ‘diagnose’.  An assessment in this regard would 
therefore require particular expertise to interpret the dynamics occurring in the family 
system on a case by case basis, in order to avoid a hasty conclusion and an 
inappropriate or even damaging recommendation and/or treatment plan. 
 
In his study, Kaspiew (2007)5 identified an overlap between a history of violence in 
the family and allegations of alienation/manipulation, which he distinguishes from the 
parental alienation phenomenon.  His research showed that two themes emerged from 
this overlap: first, alienation/manipulation was a tactic of violent fathers, who 
manipulated their children against their mothers, and the second theme was that the 
history of violence left the child feeling ambivalent about the father, which triggered a 
claim of alienation/manipulation against the mother by the father (Kaspiew, 2007).  
Further the results of his research showed that where children expressed a need for 
continuing contact with a father with a history of violent behaviour, their views were 
questioned to a limited extent, even in extreme circumstances of violence.  
Accordingly for different reasons, Kaspiew (2007) cautions against relying on 
children’s expressed preferences, which have not been scrutinized. 
 
 
                                                 
5Kaspiew’s (2007) research was conducted in the light of the shared parenting philosophy  
of the Reform Act, 1995 (Australia), which has been found to have curtailed mothers from arguing 
against paternal contact where there has been a history of violence, in order to avoid being judged as 
the not ‘good’ mother and risk losing custody.  This is relevant in the South African context given the 
legislatures intention that both parents enjoy full parental responsibilities and rights, which includes 
care (Children’s Act, 2005).   
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2.6 Children should have a say! 
 
Butler, Scanlan, Robinson, Douglas and Murch (2002) point out that irrespective of 
whether children participate in divorce proceedings, they are involved, as it is their 
parents who are divorcing.  Contrary to views that children need to be protected and 
thus not engaged in the legal process, Butler et al.’s findings reflected that despite the 
initial experience of their parents divorce as a crisis, and their resulting emotional 
turmoil, children showed resilience and a coping capacity.  Children’s participation in 
the decision-making process may even allow them to cope better with the inevitable 
changes brought on by a divorce (Atwood, 2003).  Smith, Taylor and Tapp (2003) 
strongly question the view that children lack competence in decision-making and 
further that it is an unfair burden of responsibility to involve children in decision-
making.  According to the authors, children’s resilience is strengthened when they are 
“treated as competent actors and can communicate with the other people making 
decisions in their lives” (Smith et al., 2003, p. 201).  Therefore children should be 
allowed to do as much as they can on their own, and where they cannot, they should 
be supported appropriately so to scaffold their growth towards autonomy and 
adulthood (Smith et al., 2003).  Similarly, in their study on how children between the 
ages of eight and 12 years negotiate moral authority, Thomson and Holland (2002) 
found that children are “active and creative moral agents” (p. 114) and that their 
ability to develop and take risks is very much dependent on their access to safe and 
trusting relationships.  Thus, instead of merely declaring a child incompetent, there is 
an onus on the adults to nurture a child’s capacity to make decisions.   
 
While acknowledging that parental authority protects children, Hemrika and Heyting 
(2004) also contend that “the tendency to endow children only with derived identities 
can also be detrimental to their welfare” (p. 464).  An approach which recognises 
children as individuals in their own right, will reconcile both the rights and welfare 
based perspectives (Hemrika & Heyting, 2004).  In a similar vein, Melton (2005) 
argues that the recognition of rights for children, does not imply the loss of rights for 
parents.  Butler et al. (2002) contend that children’s and parents’ accounts should be 
weighed equally and that children “are not only relevant and competent witnesses to 
the process of their parents’ divorce, they are also the most reliable witnesses of their 
own experience” (p. 99).  Davies (2004) does not adopt a full liberation or a full 
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protection approach as he contends that each child is different and many of them are 
more vulnerable and less capable than adults.  He recognises however the dynamic 
nature of childhood and acknowledges that a child’s frailties may lessen or even 
evaporate along the spectrum of childhood, depending on the child’s age or maturity 
(Davies, 2004).  While children may not want to choose between their parents, they 
will no doubt have opinions regarding how their day-to-day activities may be affected 
by their parents divorce (Davies, 2004).  By eliciting their preferences in this regard, 
parents and custody evaluators will be assisted in drawing up amenable parenting 
plans which have a greater success of compliance (Davies, 2004).  In recognizing 
children’s right to participate, commentators point out that children should firstly have 
the right to choose whether they want to participate at all (Atwoord, 2003; Taylor, 
2006).   
 
Others argue that ascertaining a child’s views and wishes is not enough, or in some 
cases, undesirable and therefore suggest instead that children be encouraged to just 
speak by inviting a free narrative which is more empowering for the child and will 
provide information about the child’s world from the child’s point of view (Smart, 
2002; Starnes, 2003).  According to Atwood (2003), while social science research on 
the whole does not support children being the decision-makers in child custody 
disputes, it does nevertheless support children being heard.  It therefore appears that 
on the whole, the literature supports children having the right to participate in custody 
disputes, although commentators differ on how the right to participate should be 
exercised.  In summary then, Davies’ (2004) assessment of the current state of affairs, 
is spot on: “The question “should a child’s voice be heard in custody/access 
decisions”? has now largely given away to “how should that voice be heard?”” (p. 
21). 
2.7 What are the children saying? 
 
In their research exploring children’s views, feelings and understanding of divorce, 
Butler et al. (2002) found that children felt that their opinion in respect of residence 
and contact was important and that even more importantly, their opinions should be 
solicited.  Further, the researchers found that in instances where the child’s opinion 
was sought, there was a higher degree of satisfaction with residence and contact 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 17
arrangements (Butler et al, 2002).  Research conducted by Tisdall et al. (2004) found 
that a large majority of children wanted to have a say in decisions that directly 
affected them and almost all the child participants suggested that children should be 
more involved in decisions following parental separation.  However, they also 
expressed reservations about being asked to choose between parents (Tisdall et al., 
2004).  The majority of participants wanted some say about where they were going to 
live and where they should spend their time (Tisdall et al., 2004).  Bretherton (2002) 
argues for a distinction between participation and choice, the former implying a 
collaborative engagement with supportive adults, which is what children prefer, rather 
than having to autonomously make decisions themselves.  Thus, children want to 
participate and they accept that they may have to make some compromises, but they 
do not necessarily want to have to take responsibility for their decisions (Taylor, 
2006).  Similarly, the child participants in Neale’s (2002) study differentiated between 
participation and choice, and majority, placed a higher value on the process of 
decision-making rather than on the right to make autonomous decisions.  However, 
participants who had been subject to neglect or oppression in their family, asserted 
their right to decide for themselves (Neale, 2002).  Ninety-one percent of the child 
participants in Cashmore and Parkinson’s (2008) research said that they should be 
involved in the decision-making process, although not necessarily making the 
decisions.  Their research on children’s and parents’ perceptions on children’s 
participation in decision-making post parental separation and divorce found that 
“children do not feel the need to be protected from involvement in contested matters 
and that most parents support their participation” (Cashmore & Parkinson, 2008, p. 
102).  The child participants highlighted three benefits of being involved: “the need to 
be acknowledged, the belief that this would ensure more informed decisions and 
better outcomes, and the view that they had the right to determine the arrangements 
that would affect them most” (Cashmore & Parkinson, 2008, p. 95).  The main 
difference between the children’s and parents’ perceptions of children being involved 
in custody disputes, was the concern from the parents that the children may be subject 
to pressure and/or manipulation from one parent (Cashmore & Parkinson, 2008).  
While this was a concern for a minority of the children participating in the study, most 
children were more concerned about “divided loyalty, not being fair, and jeopardizing 
their relationship with both parents” (Cashmore & Parkinson, 2008, p. 101).  In Smith 
et al’s (2003) study in New Zealand, child participants were asked what advice they 
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would give to parents and the most common response given by half of the children, 
involved the importance of consulting children.  Children want to be listened to, given 
information and not be forced into unwanted arrangements (Smith et al., 2003).  South 
African researchers Louw & Scherrer (2004) found that 74% of the child participants 
in their study reported that it is very or absolutely important that counsellors at the 
Family Advocate’s Office hear their (children’s) opinions.   
 
In their research on advocacy on behalf of children (in general and not specifically in 
respect of custody issues) Boylan and Braye’s (2006) results indicated that the child 
participants wanted their case argued from their perspective and not in respect of what 
is in their best interest.  Accordingly, the researchers recommended that child 
advocates should avoid merely replicating other adult proxies who speak on behalf of 
the child (Boylan & Braye, 2006).  
 
Even against the backdrop of a traditional, hierarchical social structure, 19 of the 25 
children interviewed in Maundeni’s (2002) study in Botswana, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way in which their mothers (the custodial parent) 
communicated their parents’ divorce and resulting changes to them (Maundeni, 2002).  
Three types of dissatisfaction were expressed: “inadequate or brief explanations, 
dissatisfaction with the way in which questions were handled and dissatisfaction with 
unsought opinions and feelings” (Maundeni, 2002, p. 286).  This finding, even though 
not related to the court process, indicates strongly the desire of children to be involved 
in family related matters which inadvertently affect them. 
 
There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that children want to be involved in 
decisions that ultimately affect their lives, and at the same time they show deference 
towards their parents by not wanting to make the final decision.  Yet it appears that in 
the absence of a trusting parent-child relationship, children prefer deciding on their 
own fates. 
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2.8 Youth and immaturity? Is this really the problem? 
 
The specific provisions of the Children’s Act (2005) are unambiguous that the 
legislature did not intend for children to have an absolute right to participate in major 
decisions affecting their lives.  Clearly, the right is not an absolute one, and it is 
tempered by the requirement that the child’s age, maturity and developmental stage be 
taken into account when accessing the child’s wishes, views and opinions (s10; s31, 
Children’s Act, 2005).  It appears then that a flexible approach to custody evaluations 
is required and that each matter be decided on a case-by-case basis.  In effect, this 
means that professionals working in the field must have an in-depth, broad-based 
knowledge of developmental psychology.  This potentially creates greater demands 
on state institutions such as the Family Advocate’s Office, which is already 
“constrained by [its] context and resources from conducting as full an assessment as is 
necessary to address the needs of vulnerable children (Africa et al., 2003, p. 143).   
 
Effective implementation of these rights therefore poses challenges for welfare 
organizations such as the Family Advocate’s Office (Tisdall et al., 2004).  Research 
conducted by Africa et al. (2003) at the Family Advocate’s Office, showed that family 
counsellors’ reports lacked emphasis on the exploration of the child’s wishes.  
However, these findings were interpreted with caution as the examination of the 
reports showed a significant number of young children on whose behalf custody 
decisions had to be made (Africa et al., 2003).  Thus age is a crucial factor in 
determining what weight should be given to a child’s views and wishes (if any).  
However researchers have shown that this exercise is fraught with difficulty.  Mantle, 
Leslie, Parsons, Plenty and Shaffer’s (2006) findings showed that the age of the child 
was attributed less significance than it deserved in welfare custody reports.  
According to the authors “[e]stablishing the wishes and feelings of children for 
welfare reports makes heavy demands in terms of human and financial resources” as 
practitioners work with children from a wide distribution of ages, which implies a 
“broad repertoire of skills” (Mantle et al., 2006, p. 514).   
 
James et al. (2004) found in their study that there was a lack of consensus amongst 
family court advisors over the question regarding the age at which children will be 
regarded competent to express and have significant weight attached their wishes and 
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feelings.  Gender was also an important determinant, with girls generally seen to be 
more mature than boys of the same age (James et al., 2004).  Kandel (1994) argues in 
favour of children’s choice, and specifically states that the choice of children six years 
and older should be legally “dispositive” (p. 301) to their custody in the case where 
their parents (both fit parental custodians) cannot agree.   
 
In the light of the indeterminacy and cultural difficulties of the best interest principle, 
Thomas and O’Kane (1998) contend that substantial weight should be given to the 
part played by children of any age, instead of relying heavily on adult determinations 
of what is in the child’s best interest.  In a Welsh study (Murch et al., 1999, cited in 
Taylor, 2006), over half of the solicitors believed that the views of the children should 
be ascertained, but 22.5% of this complement limited this to children aged 12 and 
over.   
 
Aubrey and Dahl (2006) concluded from their analyses of a range of studies that 
children (even those as young as three, four and five years old) can participate 
successfully in appropriately conducted interviews.  They also found that “young 
children are not always asked for their views by those making decisions about their 
lives … [and] there are still areas where children’s voices are absent” (Aubrey & 
Dahl, 2006, p. 29).  Similarly, younger child participants in Butler et al’s (2002) 
research, also felt that they had something to contribute to decisions that involved 
them.  According to Smith et al. (2003) a child may be too young or inexperienced to 
participate formally, however this does not mean that all communication with them 
should be prohibited, nor should observations of the parent-child relationship be 
excluded.  In respect of the debates relating to the age at which a child is competent to 
participate in decision-making, Smith et al.’s (2003) argument is cogent: 
 
The issue of children of any age expressing their views is, we argue, not so 
much one of the child’s ability to provide information, as it is of the adult’s 
competence to elicit (or observe) it in the context of a trusting, supportive and 
reciprocal relationship. (p 212)  
 
Thomas and O’Kane (1998) also caution against the child’s right to participate being 
dependent on the competence of professionals.   
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Thus research suggests that in instances where custody evaluators do not have the 
requisite skills or the resources to access the voice of the child, the age and maturity 
proviso, becomes a useful and legitimate way of neglecting to consider and access the 
child’s voice. 
2.9 Custody evaluations under scrutiny 
 
The most common way of placing the child’s views before the court is through a 
report written by a welfare officer, or an expert retained by the court or the parties to 
the proceedings (Tapp, 2006).  According to Bala (2004): 
 
An assessment carried out by an independent professional is usually the best 
way to put the child’s wishes and views before the court.  An assessor can 
conduct several interviews with the child over a period of time in a relatively 
relaxed setting and should be able to establish a rapport with the child.  In 
contrast, a child’s testimony in court, or even a judicial interview in chambers, 
is a very stressful environment for a child, and one in which the child is much 
less likely to reveal his or her true feelings.  By interviewing a child on more 
than one occasion, the assessor can establish whether the child’s views are 
fixed or vary depending on the immediate circumstances. (p. 490) 
 
Hovath, et al. (2002) who undertook a content analysis of evaluation practices in child 
custody cases, recommended that multiple methods of information gathering is 
necessary in order to make decisions regarding custody.  Such methods should 
include a combination of family interviews, psychological testing, observations of 
each parent and child, interviews with other relevant persons, and home visits (Hovath 
et al., 2002).   
 
The benefit of securing a report from a child psychologist is that it offers the child the 
opportunity to speak with someone who is trained to communicate with children in 
stressful situations and who is able to contextualize the child’s views and ensure that 
what the child communicated, is heard correctly (Tapp, 2006).  However, there are 
also concerns that judges rely too heavily on expert testimony, especially when a case 
is particularly complex and the court is faced with uncertainty and a difficult choice 
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(Bala, 2004).  According to Bala (2004) expert reports/testimony often include 
aspects which are “predictive and value-based” and the court cannot be certain that 
the information provided is objective and based on authoritative social science 
knowledge (p. 7).   
 
Expert testimony in custody disputes has also come under fire in South Africa.  
Bonthuys (2001) considered the usefulness of expert testimony by critically analysing 
how it is being used in South African custody cases.  Her analysis showed that mental 
health professionals based their “opinions on a perplexing and seemingly arbitrary 
array of factors”, which she attributes to insufficient training (Bonthuys, 2001, p. 
332).   
 
Bonthuys (2001) further argues that the usefulness of expert testimony is affected 
negatively by the fact that there is no single theory of human behaviour and pathology 
that is being used in assessing children’s interests, which invariably results in 
considerable disagreement amongst mental health professionals.  She also comments 
on the competing functions and different nomenclatures of the legal and mental health 
fraternities which force mental health experts to reduce and simplify their knowledge 
in service of the legal process (Bonthuys, 2001).  For these reasons (and others) 
Bonthuys (2001) respectfully criticises those judges who suspend their “critical 
faculties” (p. 334) and vehemently cautions them against “allowing mental health 
practitioners to decide difficult cases for them” (p. 346). 
 
In order to address and alleviate the difficulties of custody evaluation, Ramage and 
Barnard (2005) advocate a standardised set of procedures and processes which are 
consistently applied, even though they acknowledge that there is often not a perfect fit 
between an individual practitioner and a set of guidelines.  Consistency has two 
advantages: it creates a sense of comfort for the clinician and it creates credibility for 
the clinician from the legal profession (Ramage and Barnard, 2005).  In Ramage and 
Barnard’s (2005) opinion, for custody evaluations to be effective, evaluators need to 
be able to assess individuals and families using different theoretical orientations (for 
example psychodynamic and family systems models), be skilled in child and adult 
psychometric measures, and have adequate training and knowledge of developmental 
psychology, child and adolescent psychology, psychopathology and the issues 
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pertaining to divorce.  Further, according Fridhandler (2008), there is a responsibility 
on the evaluator to ensure that the reader of the report knows whether the statements 
made in the report are “guided by research and, beyond this, in what ways they reflect 
clinical experience, current thinking among evaluators, or inference” (p. 271).  In so 
doing, the reader can make an informed choice whether to accept, question or reject 
the statements contained in the report (Fridhandler, 2008). 
 
In United States of America, for example, the American Psychological Association 
proposed a set of guidelines (APA Guidelines) to assist practitioners involved in 
custody evaluations (APA, 1994).  More recently, a task force appointed by the 
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, drafted the Model Standards of 
Practice for Child Custody Evaluation guidelines (AFCC Guidelines) (Martindale, 
2007). The AFCC Guidelines cannot be enforced, nonetheless the intention of the 
drafters was to “promote good practice; to provide information to those who utilize 
the services of custody evaluators; and to increase public confidence in the work done 
by custody evaluators” (s1.1, AFCC Guidelines, 2007).  According to Martindale 
(2007), the task force favoured “clarity and specificity” (p. 60) in order to address the 
increasing complaints against child custody evaluators.  South Africa does not have 
an equivalent set of guidelines that have been drafted by a professional body such as 
the Psychology Society of South Africa, nor have regulations been issued under the 
Children’s Act (2005) to guide custody evaluators employed by the Family 
Advocate’s Office or in private practice.   
2.10 The Family Advocate’s Office 
 
In South Africa, the Family Advocate’s Office, which is a creature of statute, came 
into operation in October 1990, specially created to investigate and report on custody 
disputes and/or access disputes and make recommendations in a report which is filed 
with the Registrar of the relevant court (Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 
1987).  The Family Advocate’s Office derives its powers and duties from the 
Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act (1987), which was promulgated with the 
intention to safeguard the interests of minor and dependent children in divorce 
proceedings and in other applications arising from such proceedings (Brown v 
Abrahams, 2004).  The Family Advocate is briefed to protect the interests of minor 
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children whose parents’ are getting divorced or in any matter relating to custody, 
access or guardianship (Burman & Mc Lennan, 1996).  In Soller NO v G (2003), the 
court described the family advocate as a “professional and neutral channel of 
communication between the conflicting parents (and perhaps the child) and the 
judicial officer” (p. 438).  
 
The jurisdiction of the Family Advocate’s Office has been extended to include matters 
arising out of the Natural Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock Act (1997), and 
their catchment area expanded to include the former ‘Black Divorce Courts’ (Brown v 
Abrahams, 2004).  The Family Advocate’s Office must follow certain procedural 
steps set out in the regulations issued in terms of the Mediation in Certain Divorces 
Act (1987) in order to assess the facts and circumstances in each case (Brown v 
Abrahams, 2004). Each province in South Africa has a Family Advocate’s Office, 
which is staffed by Family Advocates (qualified lawyers) and Family Counsellors 
(social workers) (Burman et al., 2000).  The Family Counsellors carry out 
investigations into any case where the Family Advocate is concerned about proposed 
custody arrangements (Burman et al., 2000).  An investigation into proposed custody 
and/access arrangements or into the general welfare of the children, is initiated in one 
of three ways: at the request of one of the parties; at the request of the court; and if the 
Family Advocate decides that it will be in the child(ren)’s best interest to do so (van 
Zyl, 1994; Schäfer, 2007).  As part of the referral process, there are a number of 
preliminary documents that must be submitted to the Family Advocate’s Office.  This 
includes a document, Annexure A, “Arrangements regarding dependant and minor 
children” that must be completed by the parents (Mediation in Certain Divorce 
Matters Act, 1987).  The Family Advocate’s Office is directly involved in 
counterbalancing the competing interests of the parties involved with what is in the 
best interest of the child.  In so doing, they are now also required by law to access the 
voice of the child (s31, Children’s Act, 2005).  While the court is required to consider 
any report filed by the Family Advocate, it is not bound by its recommendations 
(Schäfer, 2007).   
 
Research conducted at the Family Advocate’s Office indicates that there is no rigid 
procedure which is adhered to when conducting an investigation (Burman et al., 2000; 
Louw & Scherrer, 2004).  Typically though, the parents are interviewed separately or 
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together (by the Family Advocate and the Family Counsellor), teenagers are 
interviewed by the Family Advocate or the Family Counsellor, and younger children 
are usually interviewed by the Family Counsellor only (Burman, et al., 2000).  The 
Family Counsellor will also interview other experts who have been involved with the 
family, such as social workers and other referees who can provide information about 
the family and the children (Burman et al., 2000).  In some instances, the Family 
Counsellor will observe the parent-child interactions (Burman et al., 2000).  Where 
the Family Advocate does initiate an enquiry, “interviews conducted are typically too 
brief and superficial to permit a meaningful opportunity for the child’s views to be 
properly elicited and understood, and very often the staff are insufficiently trained in 
the requisite skills” (Barratt, 2003, p. 156).  Where parents agree to custody 
arrangements, the Family Advocate will not investigate further (Burman et al., 2000).  
There are also cases where the Family Advocate will decide that further expert 
opinion is required and in such cases, the Family Advocate will brief a private 
practitioner to provide an opinion (Burman et al., 2000).  Where the parties cannot 
afford the cost involved, a state subsidised organisation may be able to provide a 
report (although rarely), or a private practitioner may provide a report on a reduced 
fee or for free (Burman et al., 2000).  In their research at the Family Advocate’s 
Office, Burman et al. (2000) reported on a number of criticisms levelled against the 
reports produced by the Family Advocate’s Office.  These included: indications of a 
lack of theoretical training, especially in child developmental psychology, the 
presence of religious, social and moral biases, “superficial, unstructured, and badly 
presented” arguments, and presentation falling below professional standards (Burman 
et al, 2000, p. 546).  The Family Advocate’s Office attributed most of their difficulties 
to a lack of sufficient funding which has meant that there has been insufficient 
training for staff members (Burman et al, 2000).  This is an on-going and serious 
challenge facing the Family Advocate’s Office (Africa et al., 2003; Barratt, 2003; 
Glasser, 2003; Louw & Scherrer, 2004).  
 
With regard to accessing the child’s voice in custody disputes, research conducted at 
the Family Advocate’s Office suggests that not enough emphasis has been placed on 
accessing the voice of the child in custody disputes and “it is clear that there is room 
for improvement in this respect” (Africa et al., 2003; Louw & Scherrer, 2004, p. 30).   
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The challenges encountered by the Family Advocate’s Office are not unique to South 
Africa.  According to Hale (2006) a number of criticisms have been directed at family 
court advisors in the United Kingdom who write welfare reports for the courts.  The 
first criticism was that the reports focused more on the children’s wishes and not on 
their feelings (Hale, 2006).  In this regard Hale (2006) remarks: 
 
…any judge needs to know something about the child’s feelings, the quality of 
the child’s attachments to the adults around her.  This can be done by methods 
of communication which are not open to a judge in a court room, however 
friendly its design. (p.122)   
 
A second criticism was that the welfare officers did not accurately report what the 
children had said and instead added their own interpretations (Hale, 2006).  Based on 
these criticisms Hale (2006) recommended that CAFCASS be asked to produce a 
‘wishes and feelings statement’ in order to create a distinction between the child’s 
communication, and the officer’s interpretation, so not to limit the expert from giving 
an opinion.  The observation that the child’s voice often becomes dulled or warped by 
expert ‘noise’, is not an uncommon criticism.  Speaking about a different time in 
history (during World War II), Kandel (1994) described that “… the voice of the child 
was buried so deep under the mental health expert’s opinion that it could not be heard 
without expert excavation” (pp. 314-5). 
2.11 Alternative and/or complementary methods of accessing the child’s voice 
 
Other ways of involving children in custody disputes have been explored, either as an 
alternative to recording their views and wishes in a report, or in addition to a custody 
evaluator’s report.   
 
Even though there has been a general trend against judges interviewing the child in 
court or in chambers, recently discussions on this issue have resurfaced suggesting 
that it may be a successful and not necessarily damaging way of securing the child’s 
participation in custody disputes.  In her discussion regarding how the legal system in 
New Zealand can properly give effect to their legislation, which requires that a child’s 
views be taken into account in family court proceedings, Tapp (2006) opined that 
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each child is unique and has different needs and therefore it is the responsibility of the 
family court team (which includes the judge, welfare officials and experts) to decide 
how a child’s views and wishes will be put before the court, also ensuring that the 
child’s perspective is understood and that the parents’ rights of due process have been 
protected too.  According to Tapp (2006), judges “are human too” (p. 74) and 
therefore they should be given the opportunity to individually decide on the processes 
to assist them to connect and empathize with each individual child.  In a study which 
investigated whether there is a role for judicial interviews in addition to independent 
experts and legal child representatives, Parkinson, Cashmore and Single (2007) found 
that children involved in contested custody disputes, especially where there were 
allegations of violence or abuse, wanted to talk to the judge directly.  Resident parents 
also thought that it was a good idea for children to have the option of speaking to the 
judge and in both instances, the reasons for this preference was related to “children’s 
right to be heard and acknowledged, the value of direct communication and the likely 
beneficial effect on the decision” (Parkinson et al., 2007, p. 84).  In a subsequent 
study, participant judges agreed that it was useful hearing children’s views first hand, 
and those who had experienced interviewing children, felt that it had improved their 
decision-making, or their confidence in the decision that they had made (Parkinson & 
Cashmore, 2007).  According to Hale (2006) a number of advantages follow from the 
court being more willing to see the child.  These include: the child being seen as a real 
person, the opportunity for the court to learn more about the child’s wishes and 
feelings and the child feeling valued and respected (Hale, 2006). 
 
Another way in which children’s views can be brought before the court is through the 
appointment of a separate legal advisor.  The Constitution (1996) also provides for the 
separate legal representation of minor children “in proceedings affecting the child” 
where “substantial injustice would otherwise result” (s28(1)(h), Constitution, 1996).  
In Soller NO v G6 (2003), the court described the role of the legal practitioner as 
someone who “stands squarely in the corner of the child and has the task of presenting 
and arguing the wishes and desires of that child” (p. 438).  Similarly, in Wales, rule 
                                                 
6
 In this case, after many years of protracted litigation, the fifteen year old minor sought a variation of 
an order placing him in the custody of his mother.  The judge held that his views would be vital to the 
proceedings and that neither parent would be able to represent their son’s views in the proceedings and 
on this basis she ordered that the minor be separately represented.  The judge also explains in detail the 
role of the legal representative. 
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9.5 of the Family Proceedings Rules, 19917, provides for the separate representation 
of children in cases which cause the courts “special difficulty” (Douglas, Murch, 
Miles, & Scanlan, 2006, p. 186).  In investigating children’s and parents’ views on 
children being separately represented in family law proceedings, the researchers 
found that most children supported the idea of someone appointed by the court to help 
them have a say and similarly, majority of the parents were in favour of separate 
representation and reported that it had a beneficial impact on their children (Douglas 
et al., 2006).   
 
Ramage and Barnard (2005) recommend that family therapists become involve in 
child custody evaluations because of their specific training in understanding the 
family as a system.  They propose a systemic model for child custody evaluations that 
guides evaluators to assess the five levels in the family system: the individuals; the 
dyad (the parent-child relationship); the nuclear family; the extended family and 
related social systems such as family and friends; and the community and cultural 
systems (Ramage and Barnard, 2005).  These five levels should be considered within 
the context of five domains: the cognitive; affective; communication and 
interpersonal; structural and development; and control, sanctions and related 
behavioural domains (Ramage and Barnard, 2005).  The authors nevertheless caution 
against rushing into this process as evaluators using this model need to be particularly 
skilled in various areas (Ramage and Barnard, 2005). 
 
Holland and O’Neill (2006) recommend the family conference model8 as a way of 
allowing children to participate in decision-making in the family.  They concluded 
                                                 
7
 Rule 9.5 provides that: “if in any family proceedings it appears to the courts that it is in the best 
interest of any child to be made a party to the proceedings, the court may appoint –  
(a) an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer, 
(b) (if he consents) the Official Solicitor, or 
(c) (if he consents) some other proper person, 
to be the guardian ad litem of the child with authority to take part in the proceedings on the child’s 
behalf. 
8
 The family conference model was developed in New Zealand (building on Maori tradition) and has 
been implemented in other countries such as Australia and Canada (Holland & O’Neill, 2006).  It 
involves a meeting convened by an independent facilitator where an invitation to attend is extended by 
the child and his or her immediate family, to extended family and other significant others (Holland & 
O’Neill, 2006).  The professional sits in on the initial part of the meeting where he or she introduces the 
purpose of the meeting and allows time for the child to express him or herself, and also expresses his or 
her views on the current family situation (Holland & O’Neill, 2006).  In the second part of the meeting, 
the professional leaves, and gives the family a chance to decide on a plan, which the professional is 
obliged to respect, unless it is detrimental to the child or against the law (Holland & O’Neill, 2006).  
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from their research on children’s experiences of family conferences that despite the 
potential pitfalls, such as being exposed to conflict between the adults or not being 
listened to, the benefits, such as the resultant feelings of togetherness and seeing 
significant others with whom there had been little contact, outweighed the difficulties 
of the model.  Accordingly, the researchers contend that the family conference is an 
innovative way of protecting children’s rights within a family context that extends 
beyond just the nuclear family (Holland & O’Neill, 2006). 
 
In his overview of different methods of participation/consultation, Hill (2006) referred 
to studies which showed that children respond well to computer questionnaires and in 
some cases, children disclosed more information in the computer questionnaire than 
in self-administered paper-pencil questionnaires and individual one-on-one 
interviews.  Researchers have also proposed other methods such in-camera interviews 
(Atwood, 2003) and child-interactive video recordings (Pillay & Zall, 2005) to ensure 
that the child’s voice is properly put before the court. 
 
This is an abridged discussion of the models and methods that have been proposed in 
the literature.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that there is a smorgasbord of models and 
methods that can be considered, adopted, or adapted for use in a wide range of 
contexts which will recognise South Africa’s diversity, and respect that “one size does 
not fit all” (Tapp, 2006, p. 73).  Therefore, the benefits and limitations of each method 
need to be weighed in each particular case, bearing in mind the child (Davies, 2004).  
Ideally then, what is required is what Neale (2002) refers to as a “responsive mode of 
provision” (p. 471), which is accessible to children, and that provides for a range of 
solutions and processes (legal and otherwise) to address the problems facing children.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
The presence of a professional facilitator acknowledges that children may be potentially marginalized 
in an adult-dominated forum and that the “family may be a forum for conflict and oppression as well as 
care and support (Holland & O’Neill, 2006, p. 107). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter sets out the research design and describes the sample, the sampling 
procedure, and the analytic process within the context of the theory relating to the 
thematic content method of analysis. 
 
3.1. Study Design 
 
This study employed a qualitative methodology as it provided a framework for 
exploring the phenomenon of the voice of the child as it was represented in the 
Family Counsellors’ reports (de Vos, Fouché, Delport, & Strydom, 2005). 
 
3.2. Sample 
 
The sample consisted of 10 Family Counsellors’ reports, five of which included an 
annexed report by a clinical psychologist in private practice, who was briefed to 
provide an expert opinion in the matter.  Except for one report, all the Family 
Counsellors’ reports were written by social workers employed by the Family 
Advocate’s Office.  In the one exception, a clinical psychologist in private practice 
was seconded to the matter to act as an ad hoc Family Counsellor.   
 
The reports came from two regional Family Advocate’s Offices in South Africa.  All 
10 reports involved cases that were instituted in a High Court between the years 2006 
and 2008.  All the reports were written in English.  The length of the reports varied 
between 10 and 35 pages, the longer reports being those that included an additional 
report by a clinical psychologist.   
 
Four criteria were used in selecting the reports for inclusion in the study.  The reports 
were required to be: 
1. in respect of matters where the parties did not reach a settlement regarding 
custody and which therefore had to be adjudicated upon by the court.  The 
reason for this criterion was that the Family Advocate’s Office does not access 
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the voice of the child, in almost all instances (if not all) where the parents 
agree on custody arrangements;  
2. in respect of a finalised custody dispute where a final order of court was issued 
and further, where the court had not issued an order directing that the report 
remain ‘under seal’.  This was to ensure that the reports had already become 
public documents and were accessible via the Registrar of the High Court; 
3. in respect of cases post-2005.  The reason for this was that the Children’s Act 
(as a Bill) was gazetted in 2005 which formally recognised children’s 
participation in custody disputes and created a responsibility on the part of 
evaluators to take a child’s views and wishes into consideration; and 
4. written in English.  This criterion was for the benefit of the researcher who is 
not sufficiently proficient in Afrikaans. 
 
3.3. Procedure 
 
Convenience sampling was used in this study.  Three regional Family Advocate’s 
Offices were approached, based on physical accessibility to the office and/or whether 
or not the researcher had erstwhile contacts at a particular office.  After an initial 
telephone conversation with the relevant contact person at each office, a detailed e-
mail setting out the aims of this research and its proposed methodology was sent 
requesting access to finalised reports, which met the sampling criteria set out above.  
The representatives of two of the regional offices responded timeously and were 
willing to provide assistance.  Liaison with the third regional office was abandoned 
due to long delays in response time (to telephone messages and e-mails).  
Arrangements were made with the two participating regional offices to obtain copies 
of the finalised reports.  The Family Advocate’s Offices were informed that the names 
of the opposing parties, the children and the relevant professionals, including those 
employed by the Family Advocate’s Office, were not relevant for the purposes of this 
research study and accordingly all personal details would be omitted.  More than 10 
reports were received from the two regional offices together.  Some reports did not 
meet the selection criteria (pre-2005 or written in Afrikaans).  Those reports were 
excluded and in the end the latest reports post-2005 were selected from the remaining 
group. 
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While the reports received from the two regional offices were not representative of 
what is being done nationally, there was sufficient data for an initial study of this 
nature to get an idea of how the voice of the child is being accessed in the Family 
Counsellors’ reports.  Qualitative research by nature, “delves in-depth into 
complexities and processes” in order to describe and understand a phenomenon (de 
Vos et al., 2005, p. 74).  The aim therefore, was not to generalise the findings of this 
study, and accordingly a representative sample was not required.   
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
In order to fulfill the aim of this study, the reports, as existing archival documents, 
were analysed to extract themes that would describe how the voice of the child was 
accessed.  Thematic content analysis, which is considered to be an “accessible and 
theoretically flexible approach”, was used to analyse the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 
p. 77).  Content analysis is a form of secondary analysis which involves extracting 
main themes from existing formal resources, in most cases, archival material (de Vos 
et al., 2005).  Thematic content analysis is also concerned with “how people seem to 
understand the meanings and the phrases they use…” (Parker, 2005, p. 99).  
Accordingly, the content analysis of this research goes beyond the mere enumeration 
of categories to an examination of the theoretical relevance of the themes used in the 
compilation of the reports, bearing in mind the context of the Family Advocate’s 
Office and its legal obligations in terms of the Children’s Act (2005).  Thematic 
analysis involves a process of encoding qualitative information, which requires a 
specific code (Boyatzis, 1998).  A theme “is a pattern found in the information that at 
a minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at a maximum 
interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 4).  Themes can be 
generated inductively from the raw information, or deductively from theory or prior 
research (Boyatzis, 1998).  In this study, the categories were generated deductively 
and the themes and sub-themes inductively.  Prior to generating themes, the contents 
of the reports were thoroughly perused in order to get a feel for the structure and the 
style of the documents.  Later, each report was carefully read several times, while 
notes on the content were recorded.  The first record of notes on each report included 
a list of all the topics considered in the report.  Further, notes were also made of how 
the information was accessed, for example whether the Family Counsellor had 
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conducted an interview or a home visit and, from whom the information was sourced.  
None of the topics recorded from the 10 reports were abandoned; instead a process of 
connecting the similarities and differences in the data was followed in order to 
uncover the themes and patterns in the data (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  From 
this initial list, topics were grouped together under broad themes.  Thus, for example a 
list including topics such as, child safety, school fees and medical care, was grouped 
together under a sub-theme called, “Primary needs” and later additional sub-themes 
were created and grouped under a main theme.  Accordingly, this part of the 
analytical process was inductive as the data was coded “without trying to fit it into a 
pre-existing coding frame or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 83).  The intention behind the inductive method of coding was to 
keep as close as possible to the raw information in order to appreciate the “gross (i.e., 
easily evident) and “intricate (i.e., difficult-to-discern) aspects of the information” 
(Bozatzis, 1998, p. 30).  As the process continued, the analysis became more refined 
through connecting related themes and consequently the number of themes was 
reduced and further sub-themes were included to create a more logical structure.   
 
In order to represent who was doing the reporting, categories were created to reflect 
the way in which the child’s voice was being represented in the reports.  Through this 
process, it became evident that the themes and sub-themes that were emerging could 
all be categorised under one category, which reflected that a number of proxies were 
used to speak on behalf of children.  However, there were two other patterns evident 
in the data, which also needed to be categorised.  The three categories were generated 
deductively, having regard to existing theory on children’s participation in child 
custody disputes.  According to the literature, children’s voices are accessed directly, 
sometimes disqualified (for a number of reasons) and often accessed through the use 
of a proxy.  Based on this knowledge, three categories were generated, namely: the 
child’s voice is accessed directly; the child’s voice is disqualified; and the archetypal 
child’s voice is accessed through a proxy.  Thematic codes were created following 
Boyatzis’ (1998) structure of a meaningful code.  The codes defined and described 
each theme and category and clearly identified qualifications or exclusions to the 
theme.  The codes were then tested against the data, by finding both positive and 
negative examples in order to eliminate confusion or ambiguity when coding the 
categories or themes in the data set.   
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Colour post-its were used to identify the first two categories and the themes and sub 
themes under the third category.  Once the data set was colour-coded, the data set was 
analysed again to see whether the data was coded under the correct category, theme or 
sub-theme and also to identify instances where the categories, themes or sub-themes 
overlapped.  Where necessary, corrections were made.  Thus, while appearing to 
follow a “linear, step-by-step procedure, the research analysis was an interative and 
reflexive process” (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 4).  Through this analytic 
process, a model of how the child’s voice was represented in the reports was 
developed.  The structure of the model is set out below: 
 
 
Further, a table was created as a visual aid to assist with analysing the data.  The table 
included 10 rows representing the 10 reports and seven column headings: age of child, 
clinical psychologist’s report, psychometric assessment, direct voice, disqualified 
voice, sources of information and number of interviews with the child.  This visual 
representation of the data assisted the researcher in accessing information easily and 
quickly.  For example, the table was referred to in order to calculate how many 
reports included a clinical psychologist’s report or, to determine which reports 
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included examples of when a child’s voice was accessed directly or disqualified.  
Thereafter, information from the table and excerpts from the data set was extracted for 
the analysis and discussion in Chapter four. 
 
3.5. Ethical Considerations 
 
3.5.1. Issues of informed consent 
 
This was not a contentious issue in this study as consent to use the reports was given 
by the two participating regional offices.  Moreover, the matters were not sub judice 
or ‘under seal’ but public documents accessible to the public. 
 
3.5.2. Confidentiality 
 
No identifying details of any persons involved directly or indirectly in the custody 
dispute or in the evaluation process were included in the study.  Further, the names of 
the two participating regional offices have not been mentioned in the dissertation. 
 
3.5.3. Reflexivity issues 
 
The researcher was constantly aware of a potential bias towards expecting a certain 
outcome in the research findings.  Accordingly, this was held in mind and a conscious 
attempt was made to adopt a neutral and objective stance throughout the analysis.  
This expectation of a particular finding was also shared with the researcher’s 
supervisor in order to foster transparency in the process and to create an appropriate 
external check and balance mechanism to avoid the bias from infiltrating the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter sets out the findings of this research and discusses it within the context 
of the literature reviewed in chapter 2.  The thematic content method of analysis, 
described in detail in Chapter 3, was used to analyse the data and to develop the 
structural model which illustrates how the child’s voice was represented in the 
reports.  Three theory-driven categories were deducted for the purposes of this study, 
namely: 1) the child’s voice is accessed directly without qualification; 2) the child’s 
voice is disqualified and 3) the child’s voice is not accessed but an archetypal child’s 
voice is accessed through a proxy.  Category 3 was divided into two themes and a 
number of sub-themes, which were developed inductively through a data-driven 
process of thematic analysis.  Each category, theme and sub-theme has been described 
and supported by quotations from the different reports.   
 
While the model included in Chapter 3, clearly illustrates and distinguishes between 
the different categories and themes, the results showed that the data extracted from the 
reports often fell within the ambit of more than one category and/or theme or sub-
theme, especially under Category 3.  This was expected given the complex nature of 
custody evaluations and the multiple layers of meaning potentially ascribed to the 
information recorded in the reports.  
 
The results demonstrated that the child’s voice, the disqualified child’s voice and the 
archetypal child’s voice accessed through a proxy, originated from different sources.  
These included, interviews with child’s parents, informal and formal interviews with 
the child, observation of the child with his or her parents, home visits, school reports, 
collateral sources (caregivers, teachers, friends, extended family, neighbours, 
psychologists) and psychometric assessments.  This multiple approach to gathering 
information is supported by international commentators on child custody evaluations 
(Gould & Martindale, 2007; Hovath et al., 2002; Patel & Jones, 2007) and it is 
included in child custody guidelines (APA Guidelines, 1994; AFCC Guidelines, 
2007).  The AFCC Guidelines (2007) state that multiple data-gathering methods must 
be as “diverse as possible” and must “tap divergent sources of data” (p. 79).  
According to Burman and McLennan (1996), the Family Advocates and lawyers 
interviewed in their study, reported that investigations undertaken by the Family 
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Advocate’s Office are inconsistent, “especially in relation to which important players 
in the family saga were interviewed” (p. 77).  While the 10 reports in the current study 
together showed that multiple methods are being used to access the voice of the child, 
the reports varied in terms of the number and combination of sources utilised in each 
case.  Bala (2004) recommended that there should be at least two interviews with the 
child, each parent having a turn to bring the child to an interview.   
 
In nine of the 10 reports, the children involved in the dispute were interviewed.  In 
respect of the Family Counsellors’ reports, a one hour “informal interview” was 
conducted with the child.  The nature of such an interview was not explained however 
this manner of description seems to distinguish it from the psychological assessments 
conducted by the clinical psychologists.  Nevertheless, the Family Counsellors 
conducted one “informal interview” in each case, except in Report 3, which involved 
a two and half year old child.  The five clinical psychologists’ reports indicated that 
the child(ren) were interviewed on one occasion only. 
 
4.1 The child’s voice is accessed directly 
In this category, the results showed that the child’s voice was accessed directly 
through interviewing the child.  The content of what the child said to the interviewer 
(social worker or psychologist), who was also the writer of the report, was recorded in 
the report through direct speech using quotation marks or through paraphrased speech 
which clearly indicated what the child said in the interview.  This included (but was 
not limited to) the child’s current state of mind, the child’s perception of the parents’ 
character traits and behaviour, the parents’ disciplining style, the child’s fears or 
concerns, the child’s relationship with each parent, the child’s relationship with the 
siblings and the child’s views and wishes regarding custody and access.   
Local and international commentators have long been arguing in favour of child 
participation in child custody disputes (Kaltenborn, 2001; Melton, 2005).  Further, 
research has shown that children, despite generally not wanting to take responsibility 
for decisions, do want to have their views considered, especially in matters that 
concern where they are going to live and spend their time (Cashmore & Parkinson, 
2008; Louw & Scherrer 2004; Tisdall et al., 2004).  However, research conducted at 
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the Family Advocate’s Office (Africa et al., 2003; Louw & Sherrer, 2004; Pillay & 
Zaal, 2005) suggests that not enough emphasis has been placed on accessing the voice 
of the child in custody disputes.  An overview of South African case law pertaining to 
custody and access, reflected that the courts have not given sufficient regard to 
children’s voices (Barratt, 2002), however more recent commentary suggests a greater 
willingness by the courts to allow a child’s wishes to outweigh other competing 
factors (Schäfer, 2007).  The procedural mechanisms that are intended to facilitate the 
discovery of children’s voices have been criticised as being inadequate (Pillay & Zaal, 
2005).  It has been elucidated that it is no longer appropriate to presume that children 
will think or feel the same way as their parents as research indicates that children 
“report a widely divergent range of views, experiences and levels of satisfaction” 
(Taylor 2006, p. 158).  Thus, there has been a steady paradigm shift worldwide 
towards conceiving children as young citizens who have the capacity to be social 
agents in shaping their own childhood, rather than just passive, incompetent, 
vulnerable beings in need of protection (Eriksson & Näsman, 2008; Freeman, 1998; 
Jans, 2004; Kaltenborn, 2001; Melton, 2005; Moloney, 2008; Taylor, 2006). 
In line with international trends supporting children’s participation in family law 
matters, legislation was promulgated in 2007 which provides that due consideration 
must be given to any views and wishes expressed by the child (emphasis added) in 
any matter concerning the child and in all major decisions involving the child (s10, 
s31(1) Children’s Act, 2005).  Accordingly, in this study a strict standard of what is 
meant by “accessed directly” was imposed in order to reflect the intention of the 
legislature and to determine the Family Advocate’s Office’s adherence to these 
provisions.   
4.2 The child’s voice is disqualified 
The results indicated that many of the reports reflected the presence of a two-stage 
process that seems to be occurring in practice: the child’s voice is accessed but then, it 
is disqualified, made insufficient or rendered not good-enough in some way or other.  
The reports in this study showed that the child’s voice was accessed but it was 
substituted or negated by another voice which was the voice of a third party or a voice 
espousing a theoretical or clinical position.  The example extracted from report 4 was 
a case in point: 
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Report 4: …[the child] did express sadness regarding her parents’ separation and 
divorce, something that she understood as them having to live in separate houses.  
The foregoing is not uncommon for children to experience in such circumstances. 
His concerns were mainly those relating to his sibling and when his parents were 
angry with him for a misdemeanour.  However, none of the aforegoing was of such a 
nature as to affect his mental state detrimentally. 
In this example, the writer of the report accessed the child’s voice by recording how 
the child felt about his parents’ divorce, ([the child] did express sadness regarding 
her parents’ divorce), however even though the writer confirmed the child’s 
experience as “not uncommon”, the child’s voice was still disqualified as it was only 
considered to be valid based on a presumption that most children of divorcing parents 
feel this way.  Thus an objective standard of what is considered normal substituted the 
child’s voice.  In the second paragraph of the example, the writer once again 
disqualified the child’s voice (His concerns were mainly those relating to his sibling 
and when his parents were angry with him for a misdemeanour) by suggesting that 
the child’s voice was considered only on the basis that his mental state was not 
affected negatively.  Therefore this example from report 4 illustrated how the child’s 
voice was rendered insufficient and less important in the face of seemingly objective 
presumptions of what is considered ‘normal’, in respect of children’s experiences 
generally (The foregoing is not uncommon for children to experience in such 
circumstances.), and in respect of mental health (However, none of the aforegoing 
was of such a nature as to affect his mental state detrimentally.).  Another example of 
this nature is set out below: 
 
Report 7: The minor children should not be separated in this matter, neither do they 
want to be separated.  They clearly verbalized their preference to be with their mother 
and to be allowed to continue meaningful relationships. 
After interviewing the children, undersigned is of the opinion that [the daughter] is 
mature enough for her developmental phase, to be taken seriously and that [the son] 
should also be heard, although the way he expresses himself, does not really give 
factual evidence to vary his position.  Due to his young age, it is understandable that 
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he might find it difficult to express his deepest emotional needs of emotional nurturing 
by his mother. 
Thus in Report 7, the disqualifier was the child’s age and developmental stage.  This 
implicitly suggested that if in the event a child is not “mature enough for [his/] her 
developmental phase” then he or she should not be “taken seriously”.  Similarly, if a 
child is too young, he or she may find it difficult to express his or her “deepest 
emotional needs” and on that basis, the child’s voice should be rendered insufficient.  
This is consistent with research findings in other jurisdictions which have indicated 
that a child’s age often determines the extent to which his or her voice is accessed 
(Crosby-Currie, 1996; Taylor, 2006).  Recent research confirms this trend.  Cashmore 
and Parkinson (2008) found that children, especially under the age of 12, had little or 
no say.  Yet, even if a child’s views need to yield to his or her long term autonomy 
interests, “this does not imply that the decision-maker can simply ignore the child’s 
point of view” (Barratt, 2002, p. 559).  Mantle et al.’s (2006) research showed that the 
age of the child was attributed less significance than it deserved in welfare custody 
reports.  The Children’s Act (2005) clarifies that the provisions directing that a child’s 
views and wishes be considered are not absolute and in all cases, are subject to the 
child’s age, maturity and stage of development.  However, it is unlikely that the 
intention of the legislature was to permit unwarranted disqualification in instances 
where the child is assessed and found to be too young and immature to participate.  
Instead it is more likely that there is an onus on the professional to illustrate with 
evidence why, in a particular case, a child’s age, developmental stage and maturity 
justify supporting the child’s views and wishes, or if the case may be, necessitate a 
finding that is contrary to the child’s views and wishes.   
The results also revealed instances where the child’s voice was disqualified by a 
professional opinion and/or clinical experience.  Reports 8 and 10 provided examples 
of this nature: 
Report 8: [The child] loves visiting [her father] and her eldest sister [sister’s name].  
She also enjoys her stay with [her mother].  Undersigned observed that [the child] 
was confused and not sure of her true feelings. 
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Report 10: He stated that he was “happy” that his parents were divorced. Throughout 
the interview, [the child] adhered to uncompromising and obdurately negative 
descriptions of his father, and with similar lack of differentiation, spoke of his mother 
with unwavering approbation.  He could recall no enjoyable experiences with his 
father, is not comfortable in his presence, and consequently, does not miss him, or 
want him in his life. 
 
[The child] appears to have conceptualized his father as “very strict”, “unfair”, 
“cross” and “dishonest; someone he is scared of”. 
 
[His mother] is experienced as “caring”, “kind, “fun to be around, “strict – but for 
our work, not as in giving us hidings”; a mother who “does her best to get what we 
want”. 
In the two examples cited above the child’s voice was accessed, however it was 
disqualified by the writers’ professional opinion on the basis of the child’s state of 
mind ([the child] was confused and not sure of her true feelings) and apparent lack of 
judgement, ([the child] adhered to uncompromising and obdurately negative 
descriptions of his father).  It is the brief of the mental health professional writing the 
report to recommend custody arrangements and therefore it follows that they will 
express a professional opinion based on their professional training and clinical 
experience.  Therefore the concern in these instances is not that an opinion was 
expressed instead, it is the manner in which the opinion was expressed that deserves 
careful examination.  In these examples, the writer’s interpretation was so tightly 
interwoven with the child’s voice that it scuppered any attempt to access the child’s 
voice directly.  Swartz’s (2005) paper on subaltern voices in the clinical setting is 
particularly relevant in the context of child custody evaluations where the legislated 
clinician-client (child) relationship confers upon the professional an almost 
paternalistic role given children’s status as vulnerable beings.  This creates, as the 
examples above illustrated, the potential for children’s voices to be “filtered through 
diagnostic and therapeutic monoculars”, erased or rendered subaltern, even though 
they may be given an opportunity to speak (Swartz, 2005, p.513). 
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4.3 The archetypal child’s voice is accessed through a proxy 
In this category, instead of the child’s voice being accessed directly, a number of 
proxies were used.  This means that the voice that was accessed, was based on a 
presumption, namely; that any child placed in the same position of the child involved 
in the dispute, would have said the same thing.  Hence, the concept of an archetype, 
meaning a “typical example of its class” (Colman, 2006, p. 53), was used to describe 
the collective experience of children, which cannot be directly represented.  
Consequently, the archetypal child’s voice was accessed through a proxy. 
4.3.1 The child is who a third party says the child is 
The reports illustrated that often, a third party acted as the proxy through which the 
archetypal child’s voice was represented.  The proxy represented the archetypal 
child’s voice by providing descriptions and opinions of the state of the child’s, 
physical and emotional well-being, behaviour, relationship with each parent, wishes 
and views and intellectual and social functioning.  Therefore the third party reported 
on what he or she thought the child’s voice would have said (based on an archetype), 
if it was accessed directly.  Two sub-themes emerged: 
4.3.1.1 The child is who a significant other says the child is 
 
Significant others included parents, neighbours, extended family members, family 
friends, caregivers or any person who had a relationship with the parents and/or the 
child.  The results showed that from this group, the proxy most consistently used in all 
10 reports, was the parents of the child.  This was an expected finding given the 
relationship to the child and their vested interest in the outcome of the dispute.  The 
results revealed that other members of this group were contacted for collateral 
however their contributions focused mainly on their opinions of the parents involved 
in the dispute and not on the child.  This notwithstanding, there were a few instances 
where a significant other, other than the child’s parents, was used as a proxy for the 
archetypal child’s voice (and evident from the examples below, to ultimately 
investigate how the parent related to the child): 
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Report 3: [ ] the day-care mother of the child, is of the opinion that the involved child 
is well cared for by [his mother] and does not show signs that he might be exposed to 
abuse. 
 
Report 10: As [the children’s godmother] noted: “The children were never afraid of 
him; they were often alone with him.  He was definitely the stricter parent, and they 
would chose [sic] to be with [their mother] because they had more fun with her.  But 
they were never afraid of him during the marriage and even for a while after the 
divorce.  He would bring them to us over the weekends when he had them – and there 
was no fear.  I never saw him lift his hand or scold them in a loud voice – he would 
speak to them seriously.” 
 
The parent proxy was mostly used to describe the child’s behaviour and report on the 
child’s relationship with the other parent, which was often maligned.  In the examples 
below, the child’s behaviour (stealing, smoking, dishonesty) or feeling state (lack of 
trust and safety, fearful), was implicitly linked to the other parent’s way of being.  In 
each instance, there was a suggestion that, but for the other parent’s behaviour, the 
child would not have been exhibiting the negative feelings or behaviour reported.   
Report 1: The [mother] reported that especially [the son] presented with problem 
behaviour, including stealing from [his father], smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, 
playing with [his father’s] fire arm and lighting fires. 
 
Report 2: The [father] emphasised that the minor child, [ ], is dishonest with [his 
mother] because a lack of trust and safety in the relationship between him and [his 
mother].  [The father] points out that he has not experienced the same degree of 
dishonesty from the minor child [ ]. 
 
Report 4: [The father] mentioned that their daughter was fearful of their mother’s 
temper as she had expressed the foregoing to him on one occasion. 
 
The parent proxy was also used to report on the child’s preferences regarding custody 
and access.  In some instances, the parent proxy directly communicated to the writer 
of the report, the child’s wish or preference.  This was reflected in report 5.  However, 
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there were also instances when the parent proxy indicated a child’s preference 
indirectly by stating what the child does not want, which invariably amounted to a 
value-judgement on the child’s relationship with the other parent.  Reports 8 and 9 
provided evidence of this dynamic: 
 
Report 5: [The father] said that he stayed with the minor children before their 
mother’s death and the children communicated their wish to stay with him. 
 
Report 8: [The mother] described [her daughter] as a lady who does not like visiting 
her father; “it’s her decision”.  She further stated that the children were 
uncomfortable visiting their father, “who had live-in girlfriends, several different 
ones”. 
 
Report 9: [The mother] has confirmed that the Rule 43 Court order allows the child to 
sleep over at [her father’s] place, but the child is reluctant to sleep over at [her 
father]. 
 
There appeared to be a greater degree of accessibility to the archetypal child’s voice 
when the parent proxy was used to report on or describe, the child’s behaviour, the 
parent-child relationship and the child’s preferences, compared to when it was used to 
comment on the child’s relationship with the other parent.  This was because in the 
latter case, what was being reported, did not directly involve the parent who was 
doing the reporting, and was merely an opinion, often motivated by the parent proxy’s 
own agenda.  Similarly, the archetypal child’s voice was also compromised when an 
unsubstantiated inference made by the writer of the report was offered.  This was 
illustrated in the example below.  
Report 1: The [father] is of the opinion that the involved children have a closer bond 
with him than with the mother.  He is of the opinion that he cared for them since an 
early age. It appears that the [mother’s relationship] (with her children) strengthened 
after [the father] received custody of the involved children and she received therapy 
after a suicide attempt. 
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This extract demonstrated how the father’s report was diluted when the writer of the 
report commented on the nature of the mother’s relationship with her children (It 
appears that the [mother’s relationship] (with her children) strengthened…), without 
clearly stating whether this information was directly reported by the father, or whether 
it was an opinion that the writer reached through his or her assessment.  Either way, 
the opinion was not substantiated and the reader was left not knowing how such an 
inference was reached.  This rendered the archetypal child’s voice less accessible.   
4.3.1.2 The child is who a professional says the child is 
 
This sub-theme referred to instances when the archetypal child’s voice was accessed 
through a professional.  The professionals involved in the custody evaluations and 
whose opinions were included in the reports were, the social worker employed by the 
Family Advocate’s Office, clinical, counselling, or educational psychologists and 
teachers.  Other evaluations may of course include input by other professionals 
involved in the child’s life or who have been briefed to assess the child.  Similar to the 
parent proxy, the professional through whom the archetypal child’s voice was 
represented, reported on, described and offered opinions on the child’s behaviour and 
the parent-child relationship, in addition to commenting on issues within the scope of 
their expertise.  Accordingly, the teachers commented on the child’s functioning at 
school, the social workers described the social circumstances at home and their 
observations of the child, and the clinical psychologists offered opinions on the 
child’s mental state, the child’s developmental stage, the impact of the parents’ 
behaviour on the child and diagnosed a mental illness.  Of course, these distinctions 
are theoretical in nature and the results revealed that there was often an overlap of 
expertise, especially in respect of the opinions offered by the social worker and the 
psychologist. 
 
Patel and Jones (2008) recommended that if a child is of school-going age, at a 
minimum, counsellors need to ascertain and report on the child’s school progress for 
the last few years to assess the child’s academic functioning and behaviour and, may 
choose to contact in person or telephonically, teachers, principals and coaches.  One 
report (report 8) included attached school reports, however even in this case, the 
reports on both children were current and there was no history of the children’s 
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functioning at school over a period of time.  While the reports reflected some input 
from educators, their contributions were scant.   
 
Report 1: Schools contacted in the Durban and Port Elizabeth area indicated that 
they did not experience the child as aggressive or presenting with any problem 
behaviour. 
 
Report 8: The principal is concerned about [the child’s] attitude at school.  She 
displays discipline and emotional problems. 
 
Report 10: According to their respective class teachers, both attend school regularly, 
are well cared for and their progress is good.  Both boys participate in sport 
activities. 
As children spend a considerable amount of their day at school, their educators are in 
a position to provide valuable, insightful information about a child’s past and current 
functioning.  Educators are able to impart information about the child’s academic 
performance, the child’s performance in sports, drama and other non-academic 
pursuits, the child’s relationships with teachers and peers, the degree of parent-teacher 
cooperation, the child’s current behaviour and state of mind at school and whether 
there have been any changes in this regard (Carr, 2006).  It is an opportunity lost 
when this proxy is not utilised fully to access the voice of the archetypal child, given 
that it is a proxy that one hopes and expects will be, objective and free of bias.  
Therefore, irrespective of whether there is an allegation of poor performance at 
school, educators’ input should be solicited in the evaluation process.   
The results confirmed as expected that the most utilised professional proxy was that 
of mental health workers, namely the Family Counsellor and where seconded to the 
case, the clinical psychologist.  This deference to mental health professionals as 
proxies to represent the archetypal child’s voice is in keeping with the general 
reluctance of the South African judiciary to interview children directly (Soller NO v 
G, 2003; F v F, 2006; Schäfer, 2007).  All 10 reports included examples of this sub-
theme, which was reflected in a number of ways.   
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In the first instance, the professional represented the archetypal child’s voice through 
a theoretical lens.  Consequently, the child was, what a theory says a child is, which in 
the two examples below, was determined on the basis of what a theory postulates 
about the child’s age and developmental stage.   
Report 1: From Stahl in “Complex Issues in Child Custody Evaluations” page 112 it 
would appear that [the child] is in the preschool developmental stage.  During this 
age the child needs predictability, routine and structure in order for the child’s needs 
to be maintained.  …Undersigned is of the opinion that all of the sudden changes in 
the child’s life such as moving from her primary residence, known environment, 
school, friends and family, might have a negative impact on the child’s emotional 
development. 
 
Report 4: Ackerman (2006) describes the years between 6 and 8 as the “age of 
sadness” which appears to be [the child’s] experience: “Children at this age have 
come to rely on the security of the family structure and interpret disruption of that 
structure as a collapse of their entire protective environment.  Their emotional 
immaturity prevents these children from protecting themselves against these losses 
(pg 4).” 
 
Thus instead of accessing the child’s voice directly in order to determine the child’s 
needs, the professionals relied on Stahl and Ackerman as theorists on child 
development, to provide an understanding of children’s needs generally, during a 
particular developmental stage, and in so doing, the professional accessed the 
archetypal child’s voice.  Along similar lines, Warshak (2003) refers to this kind of 
deference as “hearing the collective voice of children” (p. 377), which is informed by 
clinical and empirical research on children’s attitudes on various aspects of divorce, 
and children’s actual long-term adjustment.  Admittedly, this will not satisfy an 
individual child’s wish to be heard but it nevertheless assists decision makers to 
“understand what children might say with the hindsight of maturity and in the absence 
of parental pressure, loyalty conflicts, inhibitions, and limitations in perspective and 
articulation” (Warshak, 2003, p. 377).  Of course, this would require professionals 
involved in custody evaluations to be au fait with the relevant literature if it is to be 
“the implicit voice of groups of children” (Warshak, 2003, p. 377). 
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A second way in which the professional represented the archetypal child’s voice was 
through using his or her professional training and work/clinical experience.  Hence it 
was the professional’s training and experience which informed who the professional 
said the child was.  In report 8, this was based on what the professional’s clinical 
experience deemed appropriate in terms of interpersonal skills at a particular age and, 
in report 10, it was based on his or her experience on the effects of parental conflict. 
 
Report 8: …the psychologist noted that [the child] was severely lacking in 
interpersonal skills appropriate for her age.  “She has the manner and appearance of 
a lost and disconnected child which has serious implications for her ongoing 
development in puberty and into adulthood”. 
 
Report 10: The re-definition of a highly functional and rewarding family unit now 
includes [their mother] and their much loved maternal grandmother, but excludes 
[their father] and their much loved paternal grandfather and their paternal cousins, 
as well as former family friends.  This situation has the potential advantage for the 
boys, of removing them from the emotional distress of the parental conflict.  By 
aligning themselves with one parent, and alienating themselves from the other, it may 
be that the boys are stating that they need to be free of conflict that they cannot 
tolerate.  There are, however huge costs associated with this strategy of coping. 
 
While children may be able to describe how they feel or give an opinion on the 
appropriateness of their conduct, they are not in a position to measure how their 
behaviour or interpersonal skills compare to other children in their age group, or 
whether their feelings are appropriate for what they are going through.  Nor are 
children able to know how their parents’ behaviour will impact on their long term 
development and emotional well-being.  Accordingly, the professional uses his or her 
training and experience in the field to inform his or her opinion of who the child is.   
The archetypal child’s voice was also accessed through the professional utilising 
psychometric assessments.  From the 10 reports, a psychometric assessment was 
administered to a child in only one case, report 4, which included a clinical 
psychologist’s interpretation of a projective drawing test.  Hence in that instance, the 
archetypal child’s voice was represented through the professional’s interpretation of 
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the assessment results.  Accordingly, the child was who the professional said the child 
was based on his or her interpretation of the psychometric assessment. 
Report 4: [The child’s] drawings do not indicate any pathological functioning in her 
mental state.  All the drawings are conventional in their depiction of her and the 
relationships between family members.  If anything, the family drawing reflects a 
somewhat disengaged situation that probably is indicative of the state of the family. 
4.3.2 The child is what is in the child’s best interest 
Under this theme, the results reflected that the best interest principle was used as a 
proxy for representing the archetypal child’s voice.  As discussed in Chapter 2, any 
ruling in respect of custody must be made in terms of the “best interest of the child” 
criterion, which is enshrined in our Bill of Rights and enjoys statutory recognition in 
South Africa and internationally (s28 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
108 of 1996; s7 Children’s Act, 2005; Article 3(1) UNCROC).  Since before its 
codification, its interpretation and application has been debated vigorously. 
In order to properly assess a child’s needs and consequently determine what is in his 
or her best interest, it is considered vital that the child’s psycho-social history which 
describes the child’s functioning and developmental needs are included in a custody 
evaluation (Bow & Quinnell, 2002).  The results of this study showed that except for 
stating the child’s name and age (but in some cases excluding the child’s date of 
birth), the reports typically did not include the child’s psycho-social history and 
development.  Nonetheless, the pre-eminence of the best interest principle in custody 
disputes ensured that it was otherwise (and not surprisingly) extensively applied in 
each case by investigating whether certain needs of the child were adequately being 
met. 
The archetypal child’s voice was represented by setting out the child’s needs, based 
on what was considered and assumed by, the child’s parents, professionals, the law, 
psychology and the social sciences, to be in any child’s best interest.  The third party 
proxy was often used under this theme, nevertheless the significance and centrality of 
the best interest principle in custody evaluations justified a separate discussion.   
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The sub-themes which emerged through the analysis of the data, accorded with the 
APA Guidelines (1994) for custody evaluations.  Section 3 of the APA Guidelines 
provides that the focus of the evaluation should be on the resulting fit between 
parenting capacity and the psychological and developmental needs of the child, which 
involves: 
(a) an assessment of the adults' capacities for parenting, including whatever 
knowledge, attributes, skills, and abilities, or lack thereof, are present; (b) an 
assessment of the psychological functioning and developmental needs of each 
child and of the wishes of each child where appropriate; and (c) an assessment 
of the functional ability of each parent to meet these needs, including an 
evaluation of the interaction between each adult and child.  
The values of the parents relevant to parenting, ability to plan for the child's 
future needs, capacity to provide a stable and loving home, and any potential 
for inappropriate behavior or misconduct that might negatively influence the 
child also are considered. Psychopathology may be relevant to such an 
assessment, insofar as it has impact on the child or the ability to parent, but it 
is not the primary focus. (p. 678) 
The results indicated that the following needs were considered to be in the best 
interest of the child. 
4.3.2.1 Primary needs 
The primary needs referred to in the reports included the child’s need for physical 
safety, nutrition, adequate living conditions, financial security, access to health and 
medical care and access to education.  All 10 reports commented on at least one 
primary need, which in most cases was, the adequacy and/or the suitability of the 
child’s living conditions, such as in report 3.   
 
Report 3: [The father] resides at (address). The [child] lives with his father, 
stepmother and two sisters in a three bed-room flat.  The flat sufficiently provides in 
[sic] the needs of the involved child when he comes to visit [his father]. 
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This implicitly suggested that, at the very least, a child requires a roof over his or her 
head.  Additional reports on primary needs usually only ensued where there were 
allegations that certain needs were not being met, such as the child’s safety, access to 
schooling and the child’s need for access to health care as set out below in reports 8 
and 9, respectively: 
 
Report 8: [The father] views their living conditions as unsafe and unsuitable, is 
worried about their continued absences from school… 
Report 9: The child’s health and medical needs are of great importance and must not 
be taken lightly.  The parties’ personal believes [sic] and preferences should not 
affect the child in any way.  Each party has a responsibility of securing the child’s 
safety whenever the child is at their homes. 
4.3.2.2 Continuity 
In divorce cases, children’s lives are often disrupted as a result of one parent leaving 
the family home, parents’ relocating to different neighbourhoods, towns, or cities, 
living between two homes, and in some cases, themselves having to move to a new 
home, school and/or city.  The need f r continuity therefore refers to a sense of 
stability and the lack of disruption in a child’s life insofar as it is practical and viable.  
Referring to the research of a German commentator, Kaltenborn (2001) states that 
continuity should be maintained in a child’s living situation, unless the child is 
suffering in his or her current environment.  This approach is also followed by the 
South African legal system (Louw & Scherrer, 2003).  The results reflected the 
tendency to favour continuity in a child’s life.  This point is illustrated in reports 1, 2 
and 7: 
 
Report 1: Undersigned is of the opinion that all of the sudden changes in the child’s 
life such as moving from her primary home, known environment, school, friends, and 
family, might have a negative impact on the child’s emotional development. 
 
Report 2: Both minor children give the impression that they are settled and stabilised 
in their current circumstances and that they are not positive about a possible 
relocation. 
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Report 7: The [father] is highly concerned about the [mother’s] accommodation, 
employment and resulting school changes, as well as finances.  On verifying this, it 
indeed seems that the [mother] portrays a nomadic pattern, which gives reason for 
concern. 
The position adopted in these instances was that maintaining the status quo in respect 
of the child’s “known environment” was preferable over a “nomadic pattern” which, 
even if not stated explicitly, was assumed to have a negative impact on the child.  The 
extracts from reports 1, 2 and 7, provided examples of data that potentially could have 
been discussed under the theme, “The child is who the professional says the child is” 
as in each case, the writer of the report makes a negative value judgement about the 
appropriateness of a “sudden change”, “possible relocation” and “nomadic pattern”.  
However, the content of the writer’s opinion and/or value judgement was relevant to 
the discussion under this sub-theme. 
4.3.2.3 Good-enough9 parents 
 
This sub-theme related to the psychological well-being of the parents, the parents’ 
character traits which impacted on their functioning as parents, the nature of the 
parental relationship, the parent’s insight into their own issues, the presence of help-
seeking behaviour in the parents and, how the parents integrated new partners into 
their child(ren)’s lives.  Implicitly, it is in a child’s best interest to have parents who 
are good enough.  Therefore the archetypal child’s voice was accessed through such 
an enquiry.  
 
Under this sub-theme, the issue considered most consistently was the personality traits 
and mental stability of each parent.  Research by Bow and Quinnell (2004) found that 
one of the reasons why judges recommended a mental health evaluation was 
allegations that a parent was mentally unstable.  It has been held that a parent’s 
diminished ability to parent as a consequence of parental distress or poor mental 
health is a significant factor in children’s adjustment difficulties (Johnston, 1995; 
Sales, Manber & Rohman, 1992, cited in Kaltenborn, 2001).  According to 
                                                 
9
 The term “good-enough” was conceived by the psychoanalyst, Donald Winnicott.  It refers to the 
parents’ responsibility of adapting to a child’s needs and providing a facilitating environment which 
will give the child a good start in life (Winnicott, 1986).  It is within the context of this meaning that 
the term is used in this study. 
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Kaltenborn (2001) a parent’s psychological problems and/or diminished capacity to 
parent must be considered within the whole context of the case, while bearing in mind 
the child’s attachments and preferences.  Accordingly, a child’s preference for contact 
is not automatically negated where there is evidence of parental psychopathology or 
poor mental health. 
 
Information regarding the parents’ mental health was sourced through interviews with 
the parents, collateral and the results showed that in five of the 10 reports, the 
Minnestota Multiphasic Inventory-2 (MMPI-2)10 was administered to the parents.  
The MMPI was designed as an “aid to psychiatric diagnosis” and was made up of ten 
clinical scales that were retained in its revision, the MMPI-2 (Cohen & Swerdlik, 
2005, p. 361).  Different profiles of scores are associated with different patterns of 
behaviours (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2005).  Added to the MMPI-2 were content 
component scales, which provided more focused indices of content: For example, the 
Family Problems content was subdivided into Family Discord and Familial Alienation 
content (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2005).   
 
In addition to the interviews and clinical observations, it appeared from the reports 
that the MMPI-2 was also administered to evaluate the personality profile of the 
parents and to determine whether psychopathology, including substance abuse, was 
present in either parent.   
 
Report 1: Psychometric test results (MMPI-2) indicate that although [the mother] 
appears to be adequately psychologically adjusted, it is evident too that she is 
currently experiencing considerable emotional turmoil that could affect her level of 
functioning.  While there is no evidence of significant psychopathology or serious 
maladjustment, [the mother] is troubled by feelings of anxiety, tension and 
apprehension in certain situationally [sic] stressed areas of her life, while at the same 
time, continuing to function fairly adequately in others. 
 
[The mother] completed the MMPI-2 and obtained a valid profile.  Her high score on 
the Fb-scale suggests that she became fatigued during the assessment.  No 
                                                 
10
 The relevance of the MMPI (and other tests of this nature) to custody proceedings has been 
questioned (Bonthyus, 2001; Otto & Butcher, 1995). 
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psychopathology is indicated.  Her score on the Cynicism scale was also elevated, 
and the same descriptive explanation as that used for [the father] is also applicable 
here.  Alcohol and/or substance abuse is contra-indicated. 
 
In instances where the MMPI-2 was not administered, the results nevertheless 
reflected a concern for the mental and psychological well-being of the parents as a 
necessary component to meeting the needs of the child.  This is demonstrated in the 
extracts from reports 3 and 8 set out below: 
 
Report 3: Regarding [the mother’s] alleged emotional instability, she denied that she 
had ever been diagnosed with or treated for depression or a mood disorder. 
 
Report 8: Judging by the writer’s observations, [the father] is certainly the more 
stable and rational of the two parents.  [The mother] was aggressive, hostile, evasive 
and dishonest.  Her mood seemed to fluctuate markedly.  She showed poor impulse 
control, and showed little insight into the needs of her children or the effects of her 
behaviour on the children.  She contradicted herself on a few occasions. 
 
A second way in which the sub-theme good-enough parents was dealt with in the 
reports was through investigating the parents’ relationship with each other.  In this 
regard, there appeared to be an interest in the quality of the relationship between the 
parents and an investigation into the level of conflict between them.  Reports 2, 8 and 
10 illustrated the manner in which this was recorded in the reports: 
 
Report 2: It is clear that the [mother] tends to include the minor children in the 
conflict between her and the [father].  This certainly needs to be frowned upon.  The 
negative influence of them against the [father] is also not in the minor children’s best 
interest. 
 
Report 8: [The father] stated that he feared his ex-wife.  She is allegedly always rude 
and swears at him when he collects the children.  She says derogatory things, like: 
“[the child’s name], arsehole wants to talk to you”.   
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Report 10: The [father] confirmed his willingness to co-operate with this process, 
whilst the [mother] only made notes in her diary and left the office in a hurry the 
moment the meeting was over.  She made no attempt to greet the plaintiff. 
 
By implication, it is in the child’s best interest, to have as little conflict as possible 
between the parents.  While the consequences of separation and divorce may vary for 
each child, according to Kaltenborn (2001), “there is evidence that continuing 
hostility and conflict between the parents is one of the most detrimental factors for the 
children” (p. 82).  Adams (2007) argues that each parent bears the responsibility of 
valuing and working with the other parent, irrespective of what the parents think of 
each other.  In Neale’s (2002) study, the child participants placed a high value on a 
relationship of mutual respect and civility between their parents and even though they 
acknowledged that this may prove to be difficult post-divorce, they hoped that their 
parents could mange their conflict so to avoid implicating them or expecting them to 
take sides.  Child participants in Smith et al.’s (2003) research also advised that 
parents should not fight or argue in front of their children, or let their conflict impact 
on the children.  The Family Advocate’s Office appears to have adopted the view that 
less conflict between the parents is preferable and therefore the level of conflict 
between the parents was examined closely and where a parent was found to be 
causing conflict in the relationship, disapproval was expressed (frowned upon) or it 
was observed and recorded (She made no attempt to greet the plaintiff.). 
 
In evaluating the parents’ relationship with each other, parental alienation was also 
considered.  The fervent debates in the literature highlight the complexity of this 
issue.  Questions have been raised about whether children’s voices should be accessed 
where there is evidence of alienation (Bruch, 2001; Johnson, 2003; Timms, 2003).  
Warshak (2003) urges custody evaluators to rely on the ‘collective voice of children’ 
as a more reliable guide than on the stated preference of a child who is suffering from 
a pathological alienation and is unlikely to know what is in his or her best interest.  
Two reports considered whether one parent was actively alienating the child(ren) 
from the other parent. 
 
Report 4: There were no signs of parental indoctrination or alienation practices.  The 
relationship between the children and parents is positive. 
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Report 10: [The clinical psychologist] and the undersigned are concerned that the 
alienation between the boys and the [father] is not in their best interest at all.  They 
might one day experience tremendous guilt for alienating themselves from their father 
as a result of this process of alienation from their father. 
 
Where parental alienation was considered, the results showed that the children were 
interviewed and their preferences recorded.  The professionals involved in the 
evaluation exhibited thoughtfulness about the complexity regarding this dynamic and 
therefore also had regard to academic literature on the topic, often quoting extensively 
from experts to inform their recommendations, thus seemingly adopting Warshak’s 
(2003) approach. 
 
Domestic violence, as it related to the parents’ relationship with each other, was also 
investigated.  This issue arose in several reports, where allegations of domestic 
violence were made: 
Report 1:  While in the custody of both parents the children have been exposed to 
domestic violence between the parties, as well as domestic violence in the paternal 
grandparent’s home.  The exposure to the violence emotionally had a negative impact 
on the involved children.  [The son] acted out aggressively towards his grandmother 
and; [the daughter and son] could not be disciplined by family members. 
Report 9: The [mother] informed that she believes the child had been exposed to 
violence in their family over a long period of time.  There was an incident where she 
was assaulted by the [father] with the child in her arms.  The child is scared to be left 
with the [father]. 
Violence between parents has a negative impact on children and may be the 
determining factor in influencing a decision regarding access rights (Louw & Sherrer, 
2003).  Where children are exposed to violence in the home, it is even more important 
to have them participate without a “disqualifying and invalidating investigation” 
(Eriksson & Näsman, 2008, p. 272).  In their recommendations to an Appeal Court 
(United Kingdom), two eminent psychiatrists made the following recommendation: 
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In domestic violence, where children have memories of that violence, their 
wishes should warrant much more weight than in situations where no real 
reasons for their resistance appear to exist. (Timms, 2003, p. 171) 
 
Accordingly, where there are allegations or evidence of domestic violence greater 
efforts should be made to access the voice of the child directly in order to explore 
their views and wishes, or in the instance where a child is too young to directly 
communicate his or her feelings, at the minimum, the child’s interactions should be 
observed with each parent in their respective environments, and collateral information 
secured.  Further, in support of Kaspiew’s research (2007), where there is evidence of 
domestic violence, a child’s preference to have continuing contact with the violent 
parent should be scrutinized and assessed.  It is noteworthy that in both reports 1 and 
9, the allegations of domestic violence were not explored with the children, but 
instead, the professional and parent proxies were used respectively, to represent the 
archetypal child’s voice.  Given the alarmingly statistics on domestic violence in 
South Africa (Vetton, 2005), it may be prudent to explore the presence of domestic 
violence in each case irrespective of whether or not it is alleged.   
A third way in which the sub-theme, good-enough parents was explored in the reports 
was through considering the parents’ awareness of their own issues and whether they 
displayed any help seeking behaviour.  Thus where a parent exhibited behaviour that 
was potentially harmful to the child, the parent would be somewhat redeemed or 
given the benefit of the doubt, if he or she showed insight into his or her difficulties 
and the willingness to seek help in changing the behaviour that was and continues to 
be detrimental to the child.   
Report 1: [The mother] is aware of her deficiencies in terms of child rearing and is 
willing to obtain professional support to assist her in dealing with the problem 
behaviour that the children, especially [the son] is presenting with.  She already 
utilised the services of a psychologist and social worker in the past to assist her to 
deal with problems that she experiences. 
Report 6: The [mother] denied allegations that she continues to display her anger in 
front of family members.  She mentioned that she has completed her therapy two years 
ago for anger management and that behaviour does no longer manifest. 
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The writers’ attention to the parents’ willingness to attend to, and resolve their 
emotional and/or emotional difficulties, implies an acknowledgement that such help-
seeking behaviour will as a consequence have a favourable impact on the child and 
ameliorate any harm that was caused to the child.  According to Moloney (2008), 
parents have different gifts and challenges (just as in intact families) and therefore 
instead of rejecting one parent in favour of the superior other, parents should be 
supported to remain actively involved in their children’s lives so that the children can 
continue to benefit from the qualities of both parents.  This holistic approach to 
evaluating the parents, avoids mental health professionals’ reports from being used to 
conduct a “pathology hunt which often holds the litigating divorced family to a higher 
standard of mental health than intact and nonlitigating divorcing families…” (Roseby, 
1995, p. 98).   
 
South Africa has followed international trends which have shown a steady move from 
older practises, such as awarding sole custody and access to the so-called winning 
parent, towards sharing parental responsibility (Davies, 2004).  The courts are 
therefore reluctant to strip a parent of his or her parental rights and responsibilities 
and will only do so in cases where it is absolutely clear that it is in a child’s best 
interest that he or she have limited or no access to a parent (Schäfer, 2007).  It is now 
a commonly held view that children should have continuing contact with both parents 
post-separation and/or divorce, and even in instances where there are alleged concerns 
about the non-custodial parent (such as substance abuse, mental health problems, poor 
parenting practices etcetera), supervised visitation is often ordered in order to meet 
the child’s needs for having a relationship with the non-custodial parent (Birnbaum & 
Alaggia, 2006).  Nonetheless, cogent arguments have also been made which caution 
against the assumption that what is in a child’s best interest is synonymous with 
parental contact (Adams, 200711; Gilmore, 200812).  Nevertheless, the right of the 
child to have access to the non-resident parent in included in Article 9(3) of the 
                                                 
11
 Adams (2007) sets out a number of research studies which indicate that the evidence suggesting that 
contact is good for children is not as strong as assumed. 
12
 In his article “The assumption that contact is beneficial: Challenging the ‘secure foundation’”, 
Gilmore (2008) critically examines a Court of Appeal Decision (England) which supported a 
psychiatrist’s view that contact benefits most children.  He discusses research findings which do not 
support a general assumption in favour of access. 
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UNCROC13 and the right of both parents to enjoy parental responsibilities and rights 
has been legislated in South Africa (Chapter 13, Children’s Act, 2005).  This makes it 
almost mandatory for the custody evaluators to explore the parents’ positive and 
commendable attributes that mitigate against any failings on their part. 
The final issue considered in the reports under the sub-theme good-enough parents, 
was that relating to the manner in which a parent introduced the child to his or her 
new partner.  While it was not examined in detail in the reports, it was noted and 
recorded.  The results indicated a tendency to favour a sensitive approach, which 
would scaffold the relationship between the child and the new partner, to avoid 
disrupting and possibly upsetting the child.  This approach is illustrated in report 2. 
Report 2: The minor children do not get along well with [their father’s] girlfriend.  
[Their father] exposed the minor children to his girlfriend without preparing them 
beforehand.  The [father] explained that he was placed in a position by the [mother] 
to expose the minor children to his girlfriend due to the fact that the [mother] told the 
children that he had an affair with an 18 year old prostitute who was expecting his 
baby.  According to the [father], there is a positive relationship between his girlfriend 
and the minor children. 
4.3.2.4 Good-enough parenting 
Literature and guidelines on custody evaluations state unequivocally that the best 
interest of the child criterion mandates an assessment of the parents’ parenting skills 
(Horvath et al., 2002).  Included in the AFCC Guidelines (2007), is a section 
providing for the assessment of “the relationships between each child and all the 
adults who perform a caretaking role and/or living in the residence with the child” (p. 
81).   
Invariably, each report referred to discipline: the parents’ disciplining style (report 7), 
their ability to discipline (report 4) and the appropriateness and effectiveness of how 
they discipline (report 8).  Where a parent failed in any of these instances, the parent’s 
parenting skills were questioned. 
                                                 
13
 “Article 9(3) – respect for the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the 
child’s best interests.” 
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Report 4: The [father] questions the parental abilities of the [mother], specifically her 
skill in disciplining the minor children. 
Report 7: In the undersigned’s opinion, it is that the two parties differ greatly in terms 
of their personalities and parenting styles.  This makes it impossible for them to 
create a harmonious solution regarding the care of the minor children, without 
professional help. 
Report 8: [The child] is smoking and the [father] alleges that the [mother] has no 
control over her. 
Report 3 also included the results from the Parent Discipline Questionnaire (aside 
from the MMPI-2, this was the only other assessment measure administered to the 
parents and only in this report) that was administered to both parents in order to 
establish their disciplining styles, and most likely motivated by a desire to obtain an 
object view of how they discipline their children.  However, the objectivity of the 
results was tainted by the writer’s inclusion of a clinical observation (She appears 
somewhat impatient) amidst the results.   
Report 3: [The mother] also completed the Parent Discipline Questionnaire.  The 
results indicate a mother who uses, admonishment, removal of privileges, time out 
and corporal punishment as disciplinary techniques.  She appears somewhat 
impatient.  She is consistent and teaches values and moral standards. 
The focus on the parents’ ability to discipline in assessing their parenting skills is 
consistent with academic opinion that good parenting includes an ability to discipline 
appropriately, as this facilitates healthy psychological development in children (Gould 
& Martindale, 2007).   
Further, in evaluating whether the child received good-enough parenting, the parents’ 
physical and emotional availability to the child, and their involvement in the child’s 
educational and recreational activities was also considered.  It was clearly the writers’ 
intention to determine how present a parent was in the child’s day-to-day life.   
Report 6: [The mother] mentioned that she would love to stay with the minor child 
because the [father] is not [in] a position to spend quality time with the child due to 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 61
his wok [sic] commitments.  She said that she was afraid that the child might not get 
the attention he needs. 
Report 8: [The child’s] teacher reports that the parties are not involved.  “Attempts 
made to meet with the mother – appointments seldom kept.  Work often not collected 
when [the child] has been absent.” (School report) 
Report 9: It is important that the [father] should participate fully in the school and 
extra-mural activities so that the child experience having both mother and father 
involved in these aspects of her life.  A predictable schedule of contact with the 
[mother] will help the child organize her perception, and also will provide her with 
emotional reassurance. 
Reports 6, 8 and 9 emphasised the need for both parents (not only the mother) to be 
actively involved in the child’s life.  This is indicative of the shift towards co-
parenting and the rejection of the traditional view that mothers are automatically the 
primary caregivers.  The absence of a parent’s emotional and physical availability to a 
child would imply neglect and in extreme cases, considered to be child abuse.  An 
example of an allegation of child abuse was recorded in report 3. 
Report 3: [The father] alleges that his ex-wife started mixing with the wrong people 
after their divorce.  She allegedly started drinking excessively, and had been 
ostracised by her mother and sister.  He stated [the mother] had treated [the child] 
poorly, that he been neglected, and that she attended late-night parties with [the 
child] in the car.  She allegedly left him unattended and would not feed him. 
As with domestic violence, child abuse in South Africa is endemic (South African 
Police Service, 2006) and therefore an investigation into whether a child has been 
abused should be routine in child custody evaluations, as information of this nature 
may not spontaneously be volunteered by the parents or the child (Horvath et al., 
2002).  Where there is evidence of abuse, extra measures should be employed to 
access the voice of the child directly and alternative procedures explored where the 
child is too young to express him/herself verbally.  Further, collateral sources should 
be accessed. 
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Another issue related to good-enough parenting related to the values and morals held 
by the parents, which usually concerned extra-marital sex, religion or alcohol.  Report 
3 reflected all three issues: 
Report 3: [The father] stated that he used virtually no alcohol.  He takes [the child] to 
church on Sundays. … [The father accuses [the mother] of behaving in a sexually 
immoral way.  He appears to be referring to her living with [her boyfriend]. 
According to Louw & Sherrer (2003), morality should only be important to the extent 
that it impacts negatively on a parent’s ability to care for the child.  Divorce 
legislation internationally and in South Africa no longer contains provisions 
regulating adultery and malicious desertion where infidelity was proved (Divorce Act, 
1979; Himonga, 2007; Moloney, 2008).  Therefore infidelity is no longer a deciding 
factor in custody evaluations, where previously it was likely that custody would be 
awarded to the innocent parent (Heaton, Church, & Church, 2006).  None of the 
reports included value judgments and parents’ accusations of immorality were 
considered insofar as it related to the child’s well-being.  
The last issue that arose under good-enough parenting, was the need to maintain 
social relations and networks that the child had prior to the divorce.  This 
understandably contributes to a sense of security and familiarity in the wake of 
experiencing a sense of loss and grief for what used to be.  Thus, report 10 illustrated 
the need for the child to continue having a relationship with loved ones, and implicit 
in this, was the acknowledgement that parenting ideally involves more that what the 
parents can offer the child individually, especially in the case of single parenting. 
Report 6: [The father] acknowledged the fact that he does not have[a] support system 
and agreed that it was best for the child to remain under the [mother’s] care wherein 
his social relations will be strengthened. 
Report 10: According to the [father], the mother has after the divorce broken all ties 
with former friends and the paternal grandfather – people who the children used to 
love, and who played a positive role in their lives. 
Therefore, in making their recommendations, custody evaluators are likely to consider 
whether the parents have a support network of people on whom they can rely on to 
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assist with parenting where necessary, and with whom the child can develop and 
strengthen relationships.   
4.4 How is the child’s voice accessed directly without qualification? 
In the process of analysing and describing the results of this research, it became 
increasingly evident that the Family Advocate’s Office relied heavily on the 
archetypal child’s voice represented through various proxies, in their process of 
evaluation and making recommendations to the court.  However, the results also 
showed that the child’s voice was accessed directly, and in some instances, it was 
accessed without disqualification.   
The results indicated that all 10 reports accessed the child’s voice to a lesser or greater 
extent depending, in some instances, on child’s age.  In other instances, the minimalist 
approach to accessing the voice of the child, may be explained by the challenges 
facing the Family Advocate’s Office such as the volume of work, time pressures, lack 
of resources and lack of training in child psychology (Barratt, 2002).  Mostly 
however, the extent of the child’s input was directly related to the age of the child.  
Therefore, in the case of an older child, the details of the interview were generally 
recorded more fully in the report.  For example, in report 2 which concerned the 
custody of two adolescent children, ages 13 and 15, the report included information 
about their feelings about their mother’s alcohol abuse, their mother’s behaviour when 
she was intoxicated and their views regarding residential arrangements.  An extract 
from the report is set out below: 
Report 2: [The children] explain that [their mother] used to consume alcohol only 
during the weekends, but now also on weekdays, especially in the evenings.  
According to the minor children, [their mother] would consume a bottle of wine in an 
evening. 
The plaintiff becomes aggressive when under the influence of alcohol. She is inclined 
to influence the minor children negatively against [their father] when she is under the 
influence of alcohol.  She also places guilt on the minor children, accusing them of 
taking sides with [their father].  The [son], [name], confirms that his mother inclined 
to be physically and verbally aggressive towards him.  He also confirms that he has 
been chased out of the house on several occasions by [his mother]. 
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[The son] feels caught in the middle in the context of the conflict between the parties.  
He wants to please both parties. 
[The son] is concerned that he will loose [sic] his friends if he relocates to [his 
father].  He is also concerned about changing schools and leaving [his mother] all 
alone. 
[The daughter] verbalised that it will be difficult for her to leave [her mother] in 
order to reside with [her father].  She explained that she has been living with [the 
mother] apart from [her father] for almost two years now and that she is used to 
being apart from [her father]. 
In this extract the children’s voices were directly accessed.  However, greater 
inclusion of direct speech would have assisted the reader in developing a stronger 
sense of the child’s views and wishes as spoken by the child.  In report 7, which 
involved two children, ages 13 and seven, the report included under separate 
headings, the views and wishes of each child, in substantial detail compared to the 
other reports.  An extract of the report in set out below: 
Report 7: [The child] is happy and according to her doing very well at her new 
school.  She did like her previous school as well, but likes the current one more and 
already made new friends.  Living with her dad, she described as “ok”, but it is not 
the same as living with her mother.  She perceives (emphasis added) her mother as 
being more understanding of her favourite things like horse riding and visiting her 
grandfather… 
About her relationship with her father, she is ambivalent.  Sometimes they do not get 
along well.  He sometimes says nasty things.  He is strict and will talk, shout or smack 
as ways of disciplining her.   
In this report the child’s voice was accessed directly for the most part, however the 
tendency to slip into speaking on behalf of the child crept in with the use of words 
such as, “perceives” which suggested that this was the writer’s opinion and not the 
child’s.  In the case of younger of children, it was often unclear whether it was the 
child’s voice that was being accessed, even in the presence of apparent direct speech.  
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This lack of clarity regarding whose voice was accessed was illustrated in report 3, 
where the child involved was two and a half years old. 
Report 3:   He is eager to spend time with all the adults in his life. [The child] is 
advanced and well adjusted to his school.  He socialises well and is happy.  His 
mother is described as “excellent”, very caring and conscientious. 
The writer of the report did not at any stage indicate who reported this information to 
her.  Further, by writing in the passive voice, (His mother is described as “excellent”, 
very caring and conscientious.), it remained unclear whether the child communicated 
his views and feelings directly, especially in the light of his young age.   
It is particularly problematic that most of the reports failed to identify whether it was 
the child or someone speaking on behalf of the child that was reporting the 
information.  In most cases, the reader was left having to assume who the speaker was 
based on a previous sentence or a paragraph heading, such as “The minor children”.  
In most instances however, there was no indication of when the writer was reporting 
on his or her interview with the child.  As a result, the reader had to extricate the 
child’s views and wishes from a paragraph containing multiple voices which rendered 
the child’s voice barely a whisper.  Hence, constant vigilance is needed about 
protecting the child’s voice from interference so that it is heard clearly and without 
ambiguity.   
In reports 4 and 8, the content of the interviews with the children was constantly 
interrupted by either the parent’s or professional’s opinion of the child, even though 
the ages of the children ranged from five to 17 years old.  For example: 
Report 8: [The child] is seventeen years old and she feels that she cannot be forced to 
stay with [her father].  She is smoking and [her father] alleges that [her mother] does 
not have control over her. 
Report 4: Her relationship with either parent is close and positive.  There were no 
signs that she was alienated from either parent. …She had no complaints regarding 
her school experience and seemed to have a positive social involvement.  Her 
emotional assessment revealed no concerns, fears, anxieties or securities. 
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Thus, even though children may be old enough to participate in an interview and 
share their views and wishes, the potential exists for their voices to be lost in 
translation, between the process of being heard in the interview, and the process of 
interpreting and recording what was heard in the report.  The results indicated that the 
five reports which did not include reports by clinical psychologists, included the most 
uncontaminated information, directly accessed from the child(ren).  While the 
additional expertise is useful in particularly complex cases, there is a danger of 
children’s voices inadvertently becoming disqualified by professional opinion.  
Notwithstanding, there were instances in the clinical psychologists’ reports where the 
child’s voice was accessed directly and without qualification.  Report 10 provided an 
example where this was done successfully: 
Report 10: [The child] spoke of the angry feelings he has towards his father arising 
out of the circumstances of attempted contact: he does not like it when his father is 
present at school rugby matches (“I get angry because he is stalking me, looking for 
me”), when his father sms’s him (“I get very cross with him, it irritates me, bothers 
me”), or is in any physical proximity to him (“I am not comfortable with him in the 
room with me,…no, I don’t want to see him under any circumstances”).  
Another instance in which the child’s voice was heard clearly and which also 
succeeded in reflecting the age of the child (4 years) was in report 9: 
 
Report 9: …she mentioned that she only wants to visit “daddy” but does not want to 
sleep over.  She is afraid to sleep at “daddy’s” place at night.  She said her 
“mommy” said the court said she must go and sleep there.  The child mentioned that 
she plays with […], daddy’s friend.  She is a nice lady.  She said daddy is always tired 
and likes taking walks with the dog.  She said that daddy and [his girlfriend] like 
painting.  She mentioned that she has her own room and sometimes sleeps in daddy’s 
room, when her room does not have lights.  She does not like it when it is dark. 
It is fair to say that in this study, the professionals involved in the custody evaluations 
were cognisant of their legislative responsibility to access a child’s views and wishes, 
and they attempted to meet this obligation by interviewing the child.  This is a step in 
the right direction.  However, there is room for improvement, especially with regard 
to the manner in which the child’s voice was recorded in the reports.  The limited use 
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and sometimes complete absence of, direct speech, paraphrased speech written in the 
active voice and an identifiable speaker, made it difficult to ascertain a clear account 
of the child’s views and wishes.  Further, at a substantive level, where the child’s 
voice was accessed, the results reflected that the views and wishes of the child 
sometimes amounted to no more than a shopping list of statements, which left the 
reader with many unanswered questions.  For example, in report 1, where the child 
reported that “[her mother] was able to assist her in situations where she felt 
vulnerable”, the reader wanted to know, “vulnerable situations such as?”  An answer 
to this question would have provided greater substance to what the child was saying, 
and would also have offered the interviewer information which he or she could have 
explored further with the child and/or his or her parents and collateral sources.  Thus 
when the child reported that “it will be difficult for her to leave [her mother] in order 
to reside with [her father]” (report 2), an exploration of the reasons behind this wish 
would have shed light into the child’s decision-making process.  There were many 
examples in the reports where further investigation would have been beneficial to the 
enquiry.  Typically, statements made by the child appeared not to have been explored 
in any detail and therefore despite the child having been given an opportunity to be 
heard, there was a sense that a lot remained unsaid and/or unrecorded in the reports.  
However, in the light of the previous research findings that showed that not enough 
emphasis is being placed on accessing the voice of the child (Africa et al., 2003; 
Louw & Sherrer, 2004; Pillay & Zaal, 2005), the results of this research indicated a 
positive, appreciable shift towards accessing the voice of the child directly.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
 
Generally, the results of this study showed that the Family Advocate’s Office is 
cognisant of its legislative obligation to access the views and wishes of children 
involved in custody disputes.  There was evidence in some of the reports that the 
child’s voice is being accessed directly through the reporting of the child’s views and 
wishes through direct quotations or paraphrased speech.  However, even where this 
was done, the child’s contribution was lacking in depth and breadth, which is most 
likely indicative of the limited, once-off Family Counsellor’s or clinical 
psychologist’s informal interview/interview respectively, with the child.  Older 
children had a greater say in the evaluation process, yet in many cases, their voices 
were also disqualified by what Swartz (2005) referred to as the “louder resonances of 
theories and trainings” (p. 507).  Interestingly, this occurred more frequently in the 
clinical psychologists’ reports where there was a stronger theoretical emphasis on 
understanding and interpreting the individual and family dynamics.  In the case of 
younger children, their participation was limited often on the basis of their age and 
lack of maturity.  The results showed an overwhelming tendency to rely on proxies to 
represent the archetypal child’s voice.  Therefore, the reader had more of a sense of 
Warshak’s (2003) ‘collective voice of children’ rather than the actual child’s voice.  
Moreover, where proxies were used, their contributions were dominated by 
inferences, opinions and interpretations, rather than providing a detailed description of 
their observations of, and interactions with the child.  The best interest principle was 
the most frequently and extensively used proxy which may be indicative of the legal 
profession’s insistence that it is the guiding principle in matters affecting the child.  
Even though it is essential and prudent to employ the best interest principle as a proxy 
in some cases, the Family Advocate’s Office is cautioned against over-relying on it as 
this may inadvertently circumvent accessing the child’s voice directly (Aubrey & 
Dahl, 2006; Hemrika & Heyting, 2004; James, 2008).  A concerted effort was made to 
access the child’s voice, yet adult voices still remained dominant, speaking on behalf 
of the child, or overriding what the child said.  Consequently the authenticity of the 
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child’s voice and of his or her experience of the world was somewhat lost in the 
reports. 
 
5.2 Limitations of study 
 
The sample size in this study was small, a limitation created by the research design.  
Therefore the results are not statistically meaningful and cannot be generalised.  
Nevertheless, this is a preliminary study, which has yielded descriptive, analytical 
results about themes which have not been researched before.   
 
5.3 Significance of study 
 
This study highlighted that in spite of the archetypal, universal characteristics of 
children as theorised, each child is nevertheless an individual, with specific needs and 
preferences, which will be silenced if assumptions regarding what is in their best 
interest are too heavily relied upon.  As a group, they may be homogenous in some 
ways, but they are also idiosyncratic.  Accordingly, greater strides need to be made to 
access the child’s voice directly, bearing in mind in the future Komulainen’s (2007) 
argument against a narrow interpretation of the concept of ‘voice’, so that all children 
are ‘heard’ and their rights protected.  
 
It is encouraging that the child’s voice was present in all the reports, albeit not always 
direct and uncontaminated.  Nevertheless, it is now evident where improvements can 
be made.  While some challenges may persist because of inadequate funding at the 
Family Advocate’s Office, substantive transformation is possible by simply adhering 
to clearer formatting and stylistic changes, which can easily be introduced into report 
writing.  It may be judicious to include a section in the report dedicated to the child’s 
psycho-social history in order to provide a description of the child as a whole.  The 
Family Advocate’s Office may consider creating a pro forma document, which will 
guide the custody evaluators through the evaluation process and standardise the 
reports in a way that does not constrain their creativity. 
 
Accordingly, in providing a detailed description of how the child’s voice was 
represented in the reports, this study may create a greater awareness of the practices 
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that prevent a child from participating meaningfully, without “erasure and 
professional deafness” (Swartz, 2005, p. 520).   
 
5.4 Implications of findings for future research and clinical practice 
 
The findings of this study may lend itself to further empirical research on specific 
issues such as children’s views on how they would prefer to participate in custody 
disputes, for example, an exploratory study on alternative and/or complementary 
methods of participation, which are not mutually exclusive (Davies, 2004).  This 
could take into account children’s preferences bearing in mind individual and/or 
special needs and different social and cultural issues in South Africa.  Other role 
players such as judicial officers, lawyers and parents can be interviewed regarding 
their perceptions of children’s involvement in the legal process and to suggest 
alternatives.  
 
Research can also be done on how the legislative provisions such as age, maturity and 
developmental stage, could be operationalised.  Further, the operationalisation of 
“views and wishes” to include non-verbal means of accessing the child’s voice should 
also be investigated. 
 
A comparative study across the regional Family Advocate’s Offices in South Africa 
can be done in order to compare how the child’s voice is being accessed nationally. 
 
The findings of this study are also relevant in terms of policy change.  For example, it 
may be relevant to consider the child’s views and wishes in matters where parents 
agree on custody arrangements so that these children are not excluded from 
participating.  In this regard, Annexure A, may be revised in order to include a 
‘Wishes and Feelings’ statement made by the child (Hale, 2006), irrespective of 
whether or not there is consensus between the parents.  Another policy change which 
may be investigated is a shift away from the more adversarial approach to a greater 
emphasis on psycho-legal education for parents and children (Adams, 2007; Douglas, 
et al., 2006).  Further, there may be room for exploring the adoption of a recognised 
set of custody evaluation guidelines. 
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